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What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--man's
laws, not God's-and if you cut them down... d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?'
THOMAS MORE:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the changes associated with the New Deal is the replacement of
state private law with federal statutory and administrative law as the
preeminent source of public law in the United States.2 Before the New Deal,
private lawsuits provided the predominant mechanism for governmental
regulation of individual conduct, the economy, and private welfare. One
commentator explains that before the New Deal,
the vast majority of regulatory functions were undertaken by the
common law courts, which elaborated the basic principles of property,
tort, and contract. Public and private interactions were controlled
largely through those principles. Governance was largely dependent
on the states .... [Jiudges performed the basic regulatory functions
that might otherwise have been carried out by bureaucrats:
To be sure, state courts structured private law to achieve certain public
objectives.' State courts were nevertheless generally unwilling to expand the
range of common law jurisprudence beyond traditional doctrines of tort,
property, and contract law.' They were similarly reluctant to allow state

1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 39 (Heinemann Educational Exchange 1960)
(play based on the life of Sir Thomas More, Chancellor of England from 1529-1532, during the
reign of Henry VIII).
2. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 17-21 (1990).
3. Id. at 18-19. Of course the regulatory nature of these judicial interventions was not always appreciated. Professor Sunstein explains:
By the late nineteenth century common law principles came to be treated as largely
neutral and prepolitical, and indeed as purely facilitative-rather than constitutive-of
private arrangements. These principles ultimately embodied much of the structure of
laissez-faire, and they gave the nation a definitive albeit misleading sense of statelessness.
Id. at 18.
4. See, e.g., id. For example, otherwise valid contracts were not enforceable if they bound a
party to commit an illegal act. Similarly, the "Fellow Servant" doctrine and the related doctrine of
contributory negligence precluded suits against railroads and other nineteenth century industries.
This was consistent with a philosophy that favored industrial expansion over social welfare. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 301-02 (2d ed. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Main H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the
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legislatures to disturb common law ordering.6 The resulting legal regime is
aptly characterized as "a system of public law that was built directly on
private law principles."7
Advocates for the New Deal possessed a substantial and ultimately
compelling arsenal of arguments challenging the hegemony of state courts!8
Rather than relying solely on private lawsuits to regulate conduct, New Deal
legislation established federal regulatory programs. These were often
administered by federal agencies with the resources, authority, and mandate to
develop and implement public policy in many fields of law.9 As a part of the
New Deal and the federal administrative state it initiated, there are now federal
laws and agencies addressing most areas of public policy in the United
States."
The federal administrative state, however, leaves much of state private law
intact. Even where federal programs constitute the predominant source of
public law within a field, private law almost always retains some relevance.
Congress often seems unwilling to preempt all state private law from a
field." Courts are similarly reluctant to find that federal public law is the sole

Burden of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5-9 (1984). In his article, Professor Belsky explains that
courts were unwilling to expand traditional tort law to allow claims by private individuals harmed
by pollution, thereby necessitating the rise of environmental regulation enforced by administrative
entities. Id.
6. "[F]or the first fifty years of modem, urban-industrial society in the United States,
judicial review directly limited national and state legislative regulation of the economy to a
material degree." JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 32
(1950).
The most important organizing principle for interpretation was that regulatory statutes
should be construed narrowly-so as to harmonize as much as possible with principles
of private markets and private rights. This approach grew out of the idea that courts
should narrowly construe statutes in derogation of the common law.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 408
(1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes].
7. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 20.
8. For instance, they demonstrated that many forms of conduct could not be adequately
regulated within the context of private party lawsuits. They also pointed out that common law
courts were neither sufficiently representative of the population nor politically accountable to
adequately interject public concerns into private lawsuits. Common law judges were, after all,
generally chosen from a very narrow and generally conservative segment of the population. See,
e.g., infra note 114. Furthermore, they argued that many of the matters requiring regulatory attention in a modem industrial democracy should be addressed by federal, rather than state authorities.
These and other criticisms of the common law legal regime are discussed at infra Part III.A.2.
9. To be sure, in some instances, these statutes provide the basis for private legal actions
either against individuals, corporations, or the government itself. Such lawsuits provide an important mechanism for courts-especially federal courts-to continue participating in both the implementation and development of public policy. A thorough treatment of their place in the modern
federal administrative state can be found in Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982). This article points out that these "private correctives" were rarely, if ever, created to replace state private law preempted by federal
statutes. See infra Part III.D.2.
10. One commentator refers to the "orgy of statute making." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
11. Presumably, out of deference to state institutions, Congress is reluctant to become the
exclusive source of law in a field by making its work product the sole source of both public and
private law. The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994) is an example of such exclusive remedies. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. v. Deadeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987) (holding that the private remedies established by ERISA are the exclusive civil enforce-
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source of law within a field. 2 One important source of commentary on
judicial federalism captures the nature of this state of affairs:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal
systems of the states. This was plainly true in the beginning when the
federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was extremely
small. It is significantly true today, despite the volume of
Congressional enactments, even within areas where Congress has
been very active. Federal legislation, on the whole, has been
conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited
objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the
states . .
The presence of state private law within fields of law heavily influenced
by federal statutes presents courts with three choices: (1) to preempt some or
all of the state private law within the field; 4 (2) to allow state private law to

ment remedies in the field). This "deference" has created problems in preemption jurisprudence
because courts are then left to determine whether and to what extent state law may be applied
within the field. Another problem arises when federal legislation precedes the development of
private law within a field. This issue is addressed at infra Part IV.A.2.
12. Part of the reticence on the part of federal courts to find that state private law is
completely preempted may be the recognition that private law occupies an essential, if implicit,
place in the legal culture of the United States and its Constitution. As one commentator points
out: "[Alt base the Anglo-American tradition makes an assumption that is captured by the
reference to the 'background' nature of common law. That is, there are rights and duties that exist
notwithstanding the lack of action by a legislative body with respect to the area in question."
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1985).
Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized this principle in his concurrence in Pruneyard Shopping
Cr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 89 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He wrote that "[tlhe
constitutional terms 'life, liberty, and property' do not derive their meaning solely from the
provisions of positive law." Id. at 93. He pointed out that this is demonstrated by the fact that
"[q]uite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain
categories of common-law rights in some general way." Id. at 93-94. Marshall cautioned, however,
that this argument should not be read to favor "a return to the era of [Lochner v. New York], when
common law rights were also found immune from revision by State or Federal Government." Id.
at 93. As Justice Marshall recognized, it is impossible to perceive these rules as static and
unchanging; nevertheless, it is equally impossible to perceive of the Anglo-American judicial
system functioning without such rules. Chief Justice John Marshall also saw such private rights as
a fundamental part of our federal legal system: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of law whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of govemment is to afford that protection." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
13.

PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 533 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
14. Courts frequently refer to a field of law being "occupied" to the exclusion of state law
when they employ this basis for excluding state law. See cases cited infra notes 80-94. The principle of "field occupation" accompanied the development of broad federal regulatory authority and
a judicial philosophy that was quite supportive of federal authority. See infra section II.B. Although references to "field occupation" have fallen out of favor, the recent rise of references to
congressional "delicate balancing" as a basis for preemption (to prevent state law from disturbing
such "balancing") means that state law is still subject to being preempted from entire fields. Indeed, one commentator argues that these tests are "functionally indistinguishable." Paul Wolfson,
Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 69, 71 (1988). Before the
twentieth century expansion of federal regulatory authority, courts were relatively unconcerned
with the extent of the regulatory field occupied by federal statutes. Instead, they directed their
inquiry to the question of whether a specific state law could be applied without interfering with
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"operate of its own force" notwithstanding the presence or influence of federal
legislation; or (3) to employ common law process to integrate private law
principles into the federal regime in a manner that does minimal damage to
either these principles or federal objectives.' 6 Courts generally assert that indicia of "congressional intent" control their choice of these options." Statutory language is rarely so explicit, however, that it completely removes judicial discretion from this choice.' In this respect, federal preemption is one of

federal laws or policies. Courts often stated that they were pursuing this inquiry to determine
whether there was a "collision" between state law and federal policies. As discussed further infra
at notes 64-66 and accompanying text, this approach to preemption reflected a desire to preserve
state lawmaking authority. Falling somewhere in between "field" preemption or "delicate balancing" and "collision" is the approach that considers whether state law "stands as an obstacle" to
federal policies. Although this inquiry is generally sensitive to federal policies, it often stops short
of preempting entire fields from the activities of state lawmakers. See infra Part III.D.I.
15. According to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, both state and
2. For
federal courts must apply federal law rather than contrary state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
the text of the Supremacy Clause, see infra note 30. The tests applying this principle, however,
define the extent of the putative "conflict" and/or the requisite congressional "intent" to supersede
state law that must exist before state law is displaced. By requiring a direct "conflict" or explicit
congressional direction before preempting state law, courts easily find state law "operating of its
own force" even within heavily federalized fields of law. See, e.g., the cases discussed infra note
276. Although there are a number of criticisms of this phrase, it helps distinguish between state
law that has been incorporated into federal law versus state law that exists in a federalized field
because there is insufficient federalization for it to be preempted or to call for the creation of a
distinct federal rule. For criticism of the this term, see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is
There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 389 n.226 (1980), and
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881,
973-77 (1986). In some instances, courts create only the appearance that state law is operating of
its own force. In these instances, courts allow state law to apply to the extent that it does not
interfere with federal objectives. I argue that this approach covertly "federalizes" state common
law and that it is more accurate to characterize this as a form of federal common law. See infra
Section IV.B.
16. Professor Field explains that the creation of such "federal common law" is generally
limited to instances where a federal court (or state court applying federal law) first establishes the
"threshold" determination that the legal question at issue is of sufficient federal interest to warrant
a federal rule of law that is not explicitly provided by a statute. For her discussion and insightful
criticism of this "two-pronged" approach, see Field, supra note 15, at 950-53.
17. Typical of the Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning preemption is its statement
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 417 U.S. 724, 738 (1985), that "[i]n deciding
whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue." After a thorough review of the cases and commentary addressing
federal preemption, the author believes that the best description of judicial reliance on
congressional intent was made by then-Solicitor General of the United States Archibald Cox, who
wrote: "More often than not Congress says nothing about the effect that federal legislation should
have upon state laws, thus leaving the question to the Supreme Court, which under the
conventional formula repays the compliment by divining the intent of Congress." Archibald Cox,
The Supreme Court and the Federal System, 50 CAL L. REV. 800, 808 (1962). The reasons that
congressional intent is of limited value for determining the preemptive scope of federal law are
discussed further at infra notes 50, 270 and accompanying text.
18. As Professor Sunstein explains:
The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which interpreters
approach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretative meanings, and the process of
interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are not
"in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn from the particular context and,
more generally, from the legal culture. Disagreements about meaning often turn not on
the statutory terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive principles.
Courts sometimes make the goveming norms explicit, but frequently they leave them
unarticulated and latent. The principles are often misdirected or at least controversial.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6, at 411-12.
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a number of contexts where courts can resolve a choice between federal and
state authority only by applying "background assumptions"' 9 concerning the
appropriate balance of power between federal and state authority." These
assumptions foster federal authority when "nationalist" premises are employed
by judges to support the view that Congress intends, if only by implication, to
preempt state laws that may "stand as an obstacle" to federal programs."
Conversely, "federalist" assumptions often preserve state law by supporting the
argument that a direct conflict between federal and state laws or the express
intent of Congress must be demonstrated before state law is preempted."
Many of the criticisms directed at contemporary preemption jurisprudence23 can be attributed to these background assumptions. First, these
assumptions are often implicit, making preemption decisions hard to predict
and supporting the view that preemption is devoid of guiding principles. 4
Second, the conflict between nationalist and federalist assumptions ties
preemption analysis to "rhetorical excesses and its attendant contradictions,"
resulting in "destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist
extremes."" Finally, because courts and commentators approach federal
preemption as a choice between federal and state authority, they tend to
minimize or disregard the less obvious but equally significant questions of
whether and how federal preemption should be employed to preserve private
law within federalized fields of law.
This article addresses each of these concerns. First, it reviews the
background assumptions that serve as the basis for many preemption decisions.
Although these assumptions were initially solicitous of state authority, the rise
of the federal administrative state required the development of preemption
doctrines that removed state regulation from fields of law "occupied" by
federal programs. Where state law constitutes a competing administrative
regime, it is often appropriate to employ preemption as an "all or nothing"

19. In discussing the relevance of these "background assumptions," I primarily rely on the
work of Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988); see also Professor Sunstein's discussion of
"background principles," supra note 18.
20. Hart and Wechsler explained that the relative authority and jurisdiction of state and federal courts must be explored as "an aspect of the distribution of power between the states and the
federal government. Federal jurisdiction, as [this] subject is usually called, would surely be a
sterile topic were it not explored in this perspective," Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler,
Preface to the First Edition of PAUL M. BATOR Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM at xi (1953). Preemption, which determines whether courts
will apply state or federal law, must also be explored as a significant element in the division of
authority in our federal system.
21. See, e.g., the discussion accompanying infra notes 80-100.
22. See, e.g., infra note 72 and accompanying text.
23. An American Bar Association report synthesizes much of the criticism by writing: "Implied preemption doctrines coexist uneasily with Supreme Court preemption cases requiring clear
legislative intent." Kenneth Starr et al., The Law Of Preemption: A Report of the Appellate Judges
Conference, 1991 A.B.A. REP. 55 [hereinafter Law of Preemption].
24. "When [preemption cases] presenting similar issues are decided unanimously, yet with
opposite results, there is a flaw either in the rule or its application." Wolfson, supra note 14 (referring to Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461 (1984); Hayfield N. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S 622 (1984)).
25. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1124.
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choice between federal and state regulation.26 By contrast, where state private
law is concerned it is often more consistent with our federalism27 for federal
courts to incorporate principles of state private law into federal law through
the creation of federal common law, rather than preempting state law.2" This
article demonstrates that federal common law may provide a middle ground
between preempting state private law (in instances where it might interfere
with federal objectives) or leaving state law undisturbed (even though it might
interfere with federal objectives).
The most prevalent criticisms of any proposal emphasizing the common
law29 authority of federal courts are either that it usurps policy-making
authority that properly belongs to the states (a federalism based criticism) or
the authority of other branches of the federal government (a separation-of-

26. Furthermore, some areas of public policy are inherently federal and state law should be
excluded or assumed to be preempted within these fields. See discussion infra Part IV.A.I. Examples of these fields include international relations, federal Indian policy, interstate controversies,
and maritime law.
27. See supra note 12 and the materials cited therein for a discussion of the place of private
law in our federal structure.
28. This principle is especially applicable in circumstances where federal preemption might
otherwise preclude the assertion of private rights that are traditionally defined by state law. Private
causes of action are based on the longstanding principle in Anglo-American jurisprudence that a
person injured by the illegal conduct of another can bring a lawsuit against the person who caused
that harm. See, e.g., Ezra R. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317
(1914). The federalization of some fields of law, however, has resulted in the preemption of such
state defined rights. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 500 U.S. 504 (1992), the Supreme Court found a number of state private tort claims to be
preempted. Even assuming that some applications of these state actions might interfere with some
federal objectives, the Court's "all or nothing" approach threatens to leave some areas without
"private law" even though there is no evidence that Congress ever intended (or even considered)
this result. This case is addressed further infra notes 253-72 and accompanying text.
29. In a 1985 article, Professor Field used the term federal common law "to refer to any rule
of federal law created by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of
that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Field,
supra note 15, at 890. Accompanying this sentence in Professor Field's article is a footnote pointing out that state courts are able to "create" federal common law to the same extent as federal
courts whenever they possess concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts. Id. at n.30. When a state
court decision is based on federal law, rather than an adequate and independent state law ground,
the United States Supreme Court possesses the authority to review those portions of the opinion
based on federal law. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). As a result, the Supreme
Court may review state court decisions that seek to create, expand, or apply principles of federal
common law. Of course this definition provides more of a context for determining what constitutes federal common law rather than an objective test. This follows from the fact that the definition still leaves open the question of what constitutes a "clear" suggestion of federal law. Nevertheless, Professor Field's definition allows for the possibility that federal common law is legitimate. Another commentator states that "the central difficulty in any account of federal common
law [is defining when) legitimate textual interpretation stop[s] and illegitimate judicial 'lawmaking' begin[s]." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1985). Comparing these statements demonstrates that the authority of a federal court
to go beyond what it understood as "statutory interpretation" has not been resolved. Generally,
criticisms of federal common law are based on the premise that federal courts have intruded in an
area properly reserved to another branch of the federal government or within the authority of the
individual states. See generally id. As discussed throughout this article, neither federalism nor
separation-of-powers concerns are implicated when federal common law is employed to "reform"
state law instead of preempting state private law that Congress did not intend to preempt. See
infra Part III.D.l (federalism); infra Part III.D.2 (separation of powers).
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powers based criticism). This article anticipates and attempts to respond to
such criticisms.
II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

A. The Relevance of Background Assumptions to Preemption Jurisprudence

Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
constitutes the "supreme law of the land."3 This provides courts with a
uniform rule to apply to putative conflicts between state and federal laws.3 It
does not, however, provide standards for determining whether state law is
preempted by federal law.
Preemption is not the only context where courts are left with the task of
defining the relative spheres of federal and state authority without explicit
textual guidance. Ambiguity is inherent in the American political system as a
result of the federal structure of the Constitution, which recognizes the political authority of both the federal government and state governments32 without
explicitly defining the division of authority between the two.33 Courts,
especially federal courts, are generally the institution that must determine
whether federal authority has been exercised in a manner that displaces state
authority.34 Courts are frequently unable to resolve these disputes by relying
solely on direct or explicit evidence of whether the relevant federal actors

30. The Supremacy Clause reads:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
31. The Supremacy Clause specifically binds courts, both state and federal, to apply federal
law rather than contrary state laws. The Constitutional Convention discussed and rejected several
proposals that would have provided Congress with the responsibility to determine which state laws
were contrary to federal policies. See infra note 122 and materials cited therein.
32. Indian tribes, of course, constitute a third domestic sovereign entity recognized by, but
predating, the U.S. Constitution. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831),
describes the constitutional status of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." The scope of
this article is the preemption of state law by federal law. For that reason, this article does not
address the political relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. For a cogent
discussion of the lessons that the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government
may have for our federal structure, see Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI.L. REV. 671 (1989). The field of federal Indian law is,
as the name implies, a uniquely federalized field where state law has little, if any, relevance. This
aspect of the field of federal Indian law and its implications for state law operating in this field is
discussed at infra notes 147 and 185.
33. The Constitution is said to establish "a series of balanced but often ambiguous power
relationships between the branches of the [federal] government and between those branches and
their sovereign constituency. The term federalism has been characteristically used to describe this
solution, but the term has difficulties." G. EDWARD WHITE,THE AMERiCAN JUDICIAL TRADmON
17 (1988). This ambiguity has provided a means to expand and contract state and federal authority
in response to the exigent needs of each era of United States history.
34. To be sure, with respect to questions of preemption as well as other forms of statutory
and constitutional interpretation, any ruling by the courts may be overridden by the subsequent
actions of the elected branches of the federal government or by constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, courts must determine whether to interpret existing law as displacing state authority.
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intended to displace state law. Instead, they have come to rely on certain
"background assumptions" or understandings of how the government is
functioning or is intended to function.35
In a 1988 article, Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. surveyed the field of
judicial federalism, analyzing the assumptions that judges and commentators
employ to resolve the questions caused by the ambiguity in our federal
structure.36 He demonstrates that two competing models of federalism provide
the basis for resolving the ambiguity inherent in our federalism: one favoring
the power of the national (federal) government-the nationalist model-and
the other seeking to preserve state authority in their sphere as separate
sovereigns-the federalist model. As a result:
When a Federalist vision of the original [Constitutional] text and
history provides the interpretative framework ... states emerge as
sovereign entities against which federal courts should exercise only
limited powers. . . . In cases of doubt the Court commonly reasons
that Congress would have intended to respect state interests associated
with the performance of traditional sovereign functions . . ..
By contrast, "[a] Nationalist model of judicial federalism furnishes a plausible
set of assumptions to guide court decisions ...[and] its power is attested in
leading Supreme Court cases that reason from its premises that state
sovereignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights .... 38
Courts employ the assumptions underlying these models to determine whether
federal actors "intended" to supersede state authority or sovereignty.39
For example, the Eleventh Amendment' can be read narrowly to
preclude only those suits against states based on party status.4' It has also

35. For a general discussion of such background assumptions see Fallon, supra note 19.
36. Many of the "classic" questions in the field of federal court jurisprudence or judicial
federalism are considered in Fallon, supra note 19, and addressed more comprehensively in HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 13. Some of these issues include: whether Congress has the authority to
waive the sovereign immunity of states; whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions constitute an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; whether state judicial forums must be available to
litigate federal questions; and the extent to which the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a bar to
suits against states and their officials.
37. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1143-44.
38. Id. at 1145.
39. Some of the competing assumptions underlying the federalist and nationalist models
include: whether the sovereign prerogatives retained by the states generally take precedence over
the assertion of federal policies and whether state and federal courts are generally fungible or
whether federal courts have a distinct role and responsibility to protect federal rights and policies.
Id. at 1151-61.
40. The Eleventh Amendment's text reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
41. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars only those suits based on state-diversity of citizenship and not those based on federal question jurisdiction). The case credited with creating the
"shock of surprise" that resulted in the Eleventh Amendment's adoption is Chisholm v. Georgia,
43 U.S. (1 Dall.) 234, 260 (1793). Indeed, nearly all of the cases interpreting the Eleventh Amendment before the Civil War were based on diversity jurisdiction. This is not surprising in light of
the fact that the general subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts was not established until 1875.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1159-60. It is worth noting that in his dissent in Chisholm,
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been interpreted to preclude federal courts from hearing almost any suit in
which an unconsenting state is a party, including those suits based on federal
question .jurisdiction.42 Professor Fallon points out that "[n]early all
commentators who have studied this agree that the historical evidence is
mixed and that the textual language could support either conclusion. 43
According to Professor Fallon, courts and commentators are able to choose
between competing interpretations of ambiguous constitutional and statutory
provisions by analyzing these questions in terms of their background
assumptions of how our government functions or was intended to function."
As he explains, "it is accepted practice to test the plausibility of conclusions,
and thus indirectly the persuasiveness of evidence itself, by their fit with stable
'
theories or assumptions about the surrounding legal universe."45
Thus, where
courts and commentators analyze the Eleventh Amendment with the
(federalist) presumption that state immunity may only be overcome by a
Constitutional provision that unmistakably negates such immunity, its text is
insufficient to overcome that presumption.' By those who assume that the
Constitution was written or amended to allow for a strong national
government, however, that same text is read to allow suits against states in all
instances except those explicitly precluded. Because the Constitution's text
does not resolve the question," proponents of either interpretation rely on
"background assumptions" to demonstrate the basis for and veracity of their
positions. Although this allows courts to resolve the ambiguous questions
inherent in our federalism, it has not yielded consistent or predictable results,
creating 49"destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist extremes."

Justice Iredell "conceded that the outcome might differ in a suit arising under federal law." Id. at
1159 (internal references omitted).
42. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from waiving state sovereign immunity, even in a field of law reserved to
the federal government). The Eleventh Amendment has not been interpreted to preclude suits by
one state against another or suits brought by the United States. HART & WECHSLER, supra note
13, at 1166.
43. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1147; see also infra note 48.
44. Professor Fallon explains that "[blecause bits of historical evidence cannot be assessed
except-against a broader background, much of the power of the Federalist and Nationalistic
models lies in their capacity to provide a general theory of the historical nature of judicial
federalism." Fallon, supra note 19, at 1148.
45. Id. at 1147. "[M~any federal courts issues are vague or point in conflicting directions. In
such cases, it is virtually impossible to test the persuasiveness of competing evidence, arguments,
and interpretations without at least an informal understanding of the generally prevailing [federalist and nationalist] systemic norms." Id. at 1157.
46. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-28, 1131-32.
47. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133-45 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); Id. at 1145-85
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247; see also
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,35
STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
48. As Dean Nichol, Jr. explains, "[tihe content of the Eleventh Amendment limitation of
judicial authority cannot be ascertained by either logic or examination of the constitutional text."
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959 (1987).
49. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1224. Recall Professor Sunstein's statement that
"[d]isagreements about meaning often turn not on statutory terms 'themselves,' but instead on the
appropriate interpretive principles." Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6, at 411-12.
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Nevertheless, background assumptions are necessary because courts must
apply statutes and the Constitution to matters that their authors did not or
could not consider."' Yet, just as courts and commentators call upon
Congress to provide greater detail in its enactments to reduce the necessity of
such judicial "judgment calls,"'" it is entirely appropriate that courts should
explicate their background assumptions. This will provide greater clarity to
this field, and greater guidance to practitioners and legislators-both federal
and state-seeking to predict the outcome of preemption cases or influence the
drafting of legislation.
The lack of explicit constitutional standards regarding the inconsistencies
between state and federal law, 2 as well as Congressional inability to
explicitly address all potential conflicts,53 means that the same or
'
"functionally indistinguishable" 54
background assumptions are relevant in the

50. One example where specific applications of a federal rule on state authority were not
considered by its legislative drafters is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Also known as Section One of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Ku Klux Klan Act, § 1983 establishes a cause of action in
federal court for plaintiffs asserting that their federally recognized rights were denied under color
of local law. See generally Nichol, supra note 48. Dean Nichol explains that § 1983's legislative
history reveals ample evidence that Congress enacted this provision to provide federal judges with
"an extremely intrusive tool" for ensuring that state officials, including state courts, did not
interfere with or actively suppress federal rights. Id. at 985. Yet the range of interests recognized
as federal rights when the statute was enacted was exceedingly narrow. With the incorporation of
much of the Bill of Rights as federal rights applicable to state action, the range of constitutional
and other federal rights is now so broad that it could conceivably provide federal courts with
"complete supervision over state courts" Id. at 987. Dean Nichol explains that "[ilf the section is
applied with the full intrusive force that its drafters envisioned, complications that the framers
would perhaps have rejected, or at least did not contemplate, arise." Id. As a result, courts are
faced with a dilemma. It would usurp legislative authority for courts to ignore the plain language
of the statute and pick and choose which rights they wish to protect. Yet "construing [§ 1983] in
line with the framers' intent could threaten a dual judicial system." Id. at 985. Background
assumptions allow courts to avoid this dilemma by providing a means of applying statutes to new
circumstances, without producing absurd results that might interfere with the fundamental
assumptions shared by the statute's authors and contemporary society. Thus, the statute can be
applied to protect an expanded range of federal interest*s, yet its implementation is tempered by a
recognition-or application of the background principle-that its authors did not "intend" to
eliminate or obviate the existence of separate state judicial systems. Analyzing this issue based on
these background assumptions harmonizes the seemingly contradictory results reached in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (finding that traditional notions of comity and federalism
generally preclude federal courts from enjoining proceedings in state court, even where federal
rights protected by § 1983 are at issue), and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972)
(holding that § 1983 might, in some circumstances, allow federal courts to enjoin state
proceedings notwithstanding the historic and statutory prohibition against enjoining state court
actions).
51. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 30 (text of the Supremacy Clause). To be sure, the Supremacy Clause
may be read along with other provisions of th Constitution to guide judicial analysis of preemption. For example, certain fields of law have apparently been federalized by the Constitution's explicit commitment of these fields to one or more branches of the federal government. In the fields
of federal Indian law, disputes between states, and, to some extent, foreign policy, state laws are
not often incorporated as federal rules of decision and are rarely found to operate of their own
force in these fields. See infra Part IV.A.I. In most instances, however, courts are left with little
textual guidance from either the Constitution or federal statutes on what it means to be "bound"
by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
53. See, e.g., supra note 50; infra note 270 and accompanying text.
54. Paul Wolfson employs this phrase in his argument that "delicate balancing" provides
more distinction than difference from "field preemption." See supra note 14. A similar observation
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field of federal preemption. Courts compensate for insufficient evidence of
congressional "intent" by applying these background assumptions.5 These
principles are often subsumed within the rubric of canons of construction,
presumptions in favor of either state or federal authority, or descriptions of
how our federal structure functions or is intended to function.56 Because
contemporary preemption analysis generally ignores the possibility of
incorporating state private law into federalized fields, courts generally
approach preemption as an "all or nothing" choice of either preserving or
preempting state law. This approach means that preemption is susceptible to
destabilizing swings as federalist or nationalist thinking gains primacy.
To be sure, with respect to all ambiguous questions of federalism, there
are courts and commentators who argue that their position is the only plausible
reading of the relevant text or the only interpretation that is consistent with
our federal structure. For example, some argue that state law should only be
preempted by federal enactments in instances where Congress both provides
evidence that it actually considered and explicitly directed this result.57 While
this position is marked by widespread contemporary acceptance and is
advanced by noted judges and commentators," it is not, as some imply, the
only principled approach to federal preemption. In fact, it represents only one
end of a continuum of valid interpretations of the Supremacy Clause. At the
other end of the continuum are those who argue that the Supremacy Clause
requires the preemption of any state law that might interfere with federal
policies.59 Indeed, background assumptions represent such a critical part of
judicial consideration of preemption questions that even where Congress does
explicitly address preemption, judges tend to implement Congressional "intent"
in a manner consistent with prevailing judicial views.'
Over time, trends in preemption jurisprudence emerge as the implicit
assumptions applied to other constitutionally ambiguous matters influence
preemption analysis. By analyzing these trends, this article demonstrates that

applies to the background assumption employed in the preemption and the "classical" questions of
federal preemption jurisprudence listed in supra note 36.
55. This observation is demonstrated by the dramatic changes in preemption jurisprudence
discussed infra at Part ll.B.
56. Professor Fallon writes that "[i]f the [federalist and nationalist] models have one function
that is more important than the others, it is that of reflecting recurring rhetorical structures; the
models capture the rhetoric of many federal courts debates." Fallon, supra note 19, at 1150. For
discussions addressing how these assumptions are interjected (often subtly) into judicial reasoning
and argument, see, e.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6; see also Note, Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 892 (1982). The author of this note points out that "judicial imagery and rhetoric are forms
of argument that seek to persuade their 'listeners' of the legitimacy of particular uses of power by
evoking implicit assumptions about the constitutional order." Id. at 894 n.17 (citing R. PARKER,
POLITICAL VISION IN CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT (Feb. 1979) (unpublished manuscript)).

57. See, e.g., Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 55. But see infra note 122 and the
materials cited therein.
58. Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 55. But see sources cited infra note 122.
59. See, e.g., infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text. As discussed further infra notes
122-23, the Constitutional Convention left the courts, not Congress, with the authority to determine which state laws were compatible with federal programs.
60. See, e.g., infra notes 253-72 and accompanying text (discussing Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 500 U.S. 504 (1992)).
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judicial philosophy concerning the appropriate balance of power between the
branches of the federal government and state governments is a significant (if
implicit) factor in shaping the extent of federal preemption of state law. Gratuitous references to "congressional intent" within preemption decisions downplay the importance of judicial discretion.
Exposing the extent of judicial discretion within the preemption context is
relevant to this article's inquiry for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that
any formulation of preemption analysis rests upon implicit assumptions of how
the government is intended to function, rather than on the explicit text of
either statutes or the Constitution. Second, it tends to rebut the assertion that
federal preemption is the most deferential means of integrating state law
within federalized fields. 62 Because federal preemption can rarely be resolved
by textual references alone, it is necessary to engage in a more instrumental
consideration of how courts should address questions of preemption in our
federalism. 63 This article does this and ultimately demonstrates that the
postNew Deal reliance on federal preemption, at the expense of federal
common law, is inconsistent with the place of private rights in our federal
system.
B. FederalPreemption: From Conflict to Field Occupation
The Supreme Court has expanded and contracted federal preemption in
order to accommodate philosophical developments in federalism.' For
example, until the New Deal, the federal government generally concentrated
its efforts in those few areas where its authority was explicitly conferred by
the Constitution. 65 Since states were the primary policy-makers, courts
structured preemption jurisprudence to prevent federal law from interfering
with state laws. The Law Of Preemption: A Report of the Appellate Judges
Conference American Bar Association provides a helpful overview of the early
history of Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. It states that "the early cases

61. See supra note 17 (referencing comment by Solicitor General Cox).
62. For an example of federal preemption eviscerating state-based rights, see infra notes 24750 and accompanying text. Some courts and commentators assert that federal preemption constitutes a relatively benign mechanism for addressing the extent to which state law retains its relevance within federalized fields. A thorough review of the history of preemption reveals, by contrast, that it has been employed as an important judicial means to control, direct, or influence the
balance of power between states and the federal government, often to the detriment of state law.
In some instances, federal common law may narrow the scope of state private law that is preempted.
63. In this respect, this article responds to Professor Fallon's call for "models] of thought
and discourse that more adequately capture the complexity and richness of American federalism
and that check the destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist extremes." Fallon,
supra note 19, at 1224.
64. See, e.g., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter The Preemption Doctrine] (arguing that
the Burger Court shifted its preemption analysis to allow for greater state participation in otherwise federalized fields); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption,
5 CONST. COMMENTARY 311, 312 (1988) ("A careful analysis of the current cases offers strong
evidence that the trend of the law is increasingly moving away from preemption.").
. 65. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES
97-105 (1977).
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strongly suggest a Court solicitous toward state power; they contain a
considerable body of comment to the effect that an actual, manifest collision
between federal and state statutes, such as that in Gibbons v. Ogden, was
required in order for the laws of the state to be displaced." Courts also
prevented federal legislation from interfering with state common law by
applying the principle that statutes were to be interpreted in order to minimally
disrupt common law principles.67 The simultaneous application of both of
these limitations resulted in a potent constraint on federal authority.
A survey of preemption cases from the first part of this century reveals
that the idea of "field occupation" developed concurrently with and in aid of
federal regulatory authority. In the early twentieth century, when the Court
determined whether a federal law was to be construed as having a broader or
narrower preemptive impact, it almost uniformly decided that federal law
preempted only a narrow range of state laws. For example, in Savage v.
Jones,' the Court addressed the scope of a federal food and drug purity act.
The federal act only required packages to disclose the presence of certain
substances, including morphine, opium, and cocaine. An Indiana statute
required complete disclosure of the product's contents. A manufacturer sought
to prove that the federal statute defined its disclosure requirement to the
exclusion of the more comprehensive Indiana requirement. The Court flatly
rejected the argument that the federal law should be construed as the sole
source of public regulation on the topic: "The intent to supersede the exercise
by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal
legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit
to circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited field."
A number of considerations weigh in favor of the analysis employed in
Savage. First, it is solicitous of state authority, comporting with the view that
states are the primary source of law, especially laws that concern the "police
power."7 Furthermore, restricting the preemptive effect of federal legislation
creates more accurate "feedback" mechanisms to Congress, which has the
authority to remedy an incorrect decision by a court.7 This follows from the

66. The Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 13; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824) (finding that a New York statute granting a monopoly to the ferries of one owner "collided" with federal law authorizing a competitor to enter the state's waters).
67. HURST, supra note 6, at 186-87.
68. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
69. Savage, 225 U.S. at 533.
70. The notion that state laws enacted as part of a state's authority and responsibility to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens should only be displaced where there is a clear indication that Congress intended this result still retains at least rhetorical application. See, e.g.,
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) (referring to the
"presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated
under the Supremacy Clause"). Nevertheless, this principle has not been consistently applied. See,
e.g., infra notes 80-100 and cases cited therein.
71. As one commentator noted:
This is a wise distribution of power. The Congress cannot foresee in advance all the
possible interaction between state and federal law in future situations. The courts can
deal with the problems as actual controversies develop. The Congress retains the power
to reverse the judicial determination if it proves contrary to the legislative will.
Cox, supra note 17, at 809.
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fact that Congress would be more likely to notice and correct a ruling that
incorrectly preempted a smaller field than a ruling that preempted a broader
field than Congress intended. In the former case, state law would interfere
with the Congressional plan, bringing the anomaly to Congress's attention. In
the latter case, states would be inconvenienced by the absence of regulation
and would be faced with convincing Congress that the situation was worthy of
its corrective attention. Finally, because states were (at least until the New
Deal) the primary sources of public policy in the United States, it was
assumed that they would act first to address any interstices between federal
and state regulation. Thus, the Court would not wish to define preemption
jurisprudence in a way that would preclude states (the primary policy-makers)
from responding to new circumstances or issues that were not addressed by
federal legislation. Courts assumed that any gaps in the federal legislative
scheme were the domain of state lawmakers. In order to implement this
objective, courts required a conflict between state and federal enactments
before state law was preempted.72
A change in federal preemption resulted as Congress began to broaden the
range of areas regulated by the federal government, a process that can
generally be traced to the Progressive Era, but which was carried out in
earnest as a part of the New Deal.73 Congressional delegation of extensive
regulatory and policy-making authority to federal regulators reversed the
presumption that federal activity was constrained to narrow, easily defined
ranges that left unaddressed issues to state lawmakers. Courts could insteadassume that Congress would err on the side of providing adequate regulatory
"space" for these agencies to function, even if this might remove state
authority without federal authority immediately fulfilling the functions
formerly provided by state law.74 Given the number of state laws and unique
circumstances where they might interfere with federal programs, Congress
could at best only provide general guidance regarding the way it intended
federal and state law to interact. 75 Courts could search in vain for explicit

72.

Law Of Preemption, supra note 23.

73. Professor Richard Hofstadter explains:
In the years 1933-38 the New Deal sponsored a series of legislative changes that made
the enactments of the Progressive era seem timid by comparison, changes that, in their
totality, carried the politics and administration of the United States farther from the
conditions of 1914 than those had been from the conditions of 1880.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 300 (1955). Changes in judicial philosophy allowed
for this dramatic increase in federal administrative authority. See generally Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes, supra note 6.

74. See, e.g., infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
75. Kenneth L. Hirsh, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 LAw F. 515, 543
(1972). The limits on congressional analysis of which state laws are subject to preemption by
federal law are discussed infra at text accompanying note 270. One dynamic worth highlighting at
this point concerns instances where federal legislation precedes the development of private law in
a field. Obviously this makes federal legislative pronouncements about the extent of preemption
highly speculative. Nevertheless, even in these instances, some courts and commentators fault
Congress for failing to adequately address the scope of preemption "intended" by its legislation.
Such an interpretation fails to recognize that the Supremacy Clause makes courts, not Congress,
the entity responsible for determining which laws have preemptive effect. This interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause is addressed at infra notes 122-23.
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congressional guidance regarding the point where state laws impinge on
federal objectives. Congress might also allow federal regulators to determine
the rate at which they would begin to regulate different areas within a field of
law. This left administrators with some ability to define both the rate and
extent of federal preemption. Thus, while Congress would federalize a field,
the Court might look to the agency for help in defining either the extent of the
field federalized by Congress or the extent that federal regulation currently
occupies that field.76 Rather than continually returning to the question of
whether state or federal regulators should prevail, courts began to assume that
if Congress established a regulatory regime, it intended to preempt all
competing state regulation."
As federal regulatory authority gained primacy, courts could assume that
federal administrators, rather than state courts, could react most quickly to fill
gaps within the field. Hence, one incentive for structuring preemption analysis
in favor of state lawmakers was removed."8 At the same time, the notion that
narrow preemption rulings would act as a feedback mechanism to Congress
grew less tenable because Congress dramatically increased the number of
fields competing for its attention.79 These changes in institutional interaction
and purpose changed the "background assumptions" supporting an approach to
preemption that was solicitous of state law. As courts began to apply different
assumptions to their analysis of preemption questions, the entire approach to
preemption changed.
The shift in preemption jurisprudence towards a model favoring the
application of federal authority, even at the expense of state laws, is apparent
in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 0 Relying on the broad grant of authority
conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Napier Court
essentially came to the opposite conclusion of the Court in Savage. In Savage,
the court concluded that the federal law established only the minimum level of
regulation or the regulatory "floor." As a result, a state could demand
compliance with additional requirements, thereby defining a higher "ceiling"

76. See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933). The Court addressed an alleged conflict between a federal quarantine law and New York state inspection requirement. New York law
required certification by an official of the exporting state that the herd of origin was free from
specified disease. The federal law allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish quarantine districts. The Court found that the alleged conflict between the laws to be "groundless." In addition,
the Court stated that "[miuch weight is to be given to the practical interpretation of the act by the
federal department through its acquiescence in the enforcement of state measures." Id. at 351; see
also Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 ("We have repeatedly held that state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as federal statutes.") (citations omitted). For a criticism of
this principle, see Wolfson, supra note 14, at 110. Wolfson writes that "[p]reemption is not a
technical matter in which administrative agencies have particular expertise. If an agency cannot
provide a reasonable explanation for the necessity of preemption, the agency's decision should be
vacated." Id.
77. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
78. This and other factors supporting the rise of federal administrative authority are discussed at infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
79. The "congressional veto" constituted one method for allowing Congress to respond to
federal administrative authority. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (determining that some
applications of the legislative veto were unconstitutional).
80. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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of regulation without interfering with federal objectives.8 In Napier, federal
law was found to be the sole source of public law in the subject
field-essentially both the "floor" and the "ceiling" of regulation. Justice
Brandeis first framed the question before the Court by stating: "[t]he main
question ... is whether the Boiler Inspection Act has occupied the field of
regulating locomotive equipment used on a highway of interstate commerce,
so as to preclude state legislation." 2 He then rejected the requirement that a
conflict must exist in order for federal laws to preempt state law. "It may be
assumed ... that there is no physical conflict between the devices required by
the state and those specifically prescribed by Congress or the [ICC]." 83 The
basis for preemption was not, therefore, an incompatibility between state and
federal regulations, which had been the test for determining whether state law
was preempted. Simultaneous compliance with a federal regulatory "floor" and
a state "ceiling" was possible. Justice Brandeis explained:
We hold that state legislation is precluded, because the [Act], as we
construe it, was intended to occupy the field. The broad scope of the
authority conferred upon the Commission leads to that conclusion.
Because the standard set by the Commission must prevail,
requirements by the states are precluded, however commendable or
however different their purpose.84
Without doubt, what is being preserved by the preemption of state law in
Napier is not only the operation of federal law, per se, but the authority of
federal administrators to exercise the authority granted to them by the relevant
federal statute. 5
The reformulated preemption analysis that favored federal law did not
immediately interfere with private ordering based on common law principles
because the Supreme Court was initially concerned with areas of law that were
not heavily influenced by common law or with cases that did not involve a
conflict between federal regulation and state common law.86 As a result, the
Court did not need to address the fact that invalidating state law would leave
an area of private conduct without private law principles to guide conduct. 7

81. Contemporary applications of the "floor, not ceiling" dichotomy are addressed in
Wolfson, supra note 14, at 83-88.
82. Napier, 272 U.S. at 607.
83. Id.at610-11.
84. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
85. Indeed, in the last paragraph of the opinion, Justice Brandeis emphasized this point by
stating that "[ilf the protection now afforded by the [ICC's] rules is deemed inadequate, application for relief must be made to it." Id.
86. As discussed at supra note 75, in a number of cases federal statutory regulation preceded
any common law work-product.
87. In some areas, especially interstate commerce, Congress would codify a common law
rule in order to provide national uniformity. This process established national uniformity through
the use of common law rules and processes. Thus, it did not remove private law from a field, but
merely provided a single federally mandated private law rule. See, e.g., Charleston & W. Carolina
Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture, 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (recognizing that federal law imposed liability
for goods damaged in interstate commerce on the initial carrier). The desire to achieve such uniformity in common law rules was one basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson,
237 U.S. (1 Pet.) 597 (1842), which provided that federal courts were not required to follow the
"general" common law of states courts. This case and the decision overruling it are discussed infra
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Often the state regulatory regimes were themselves quite new and the
Court was only concerned with whether state or federal administrators would
have regulatory dominion over a particular area. For example, in H.P. Welch
8
v. New Hampshire,"
the Court addressed competing federal and state
registration schemes intended to limit the number of hours truck drivers could
work.89 The Court was not concerned with the fact that finding state law
preempted would leave this issue unregulated until federal regulation was in
effect. "The sole question is whether Congress intended that from the time of
the federal enactment until effective action by the Commission, there should
be no regulation . . . ." These cases did not involve a conflict with state
common law, which would have been raised if, for example, the case involved
a tort claim against a truck driver and his defense included an assertion that
federal law defined the extent of his duty to the exclusion of state negligence
principles. Such a case would have required the Court to address the extent to
which the federal regime preempted state private law principles."'
The ascendancy of this solicitous approach towards federal regulatory
authority is clear in the Supreme Court's decision in CloverleafButter Co. v.
92
Patterson.
The Court acknowledged that the case before it did not present
an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal policies. Indeed, the federal
and state agencies were cooperating in their efforts to ensure the purity of
renovated butter. 3 Nevertheless, the Court looked beyond the specific facts
before it in order to preserve the regulatory authority of the federal government within this sphere. The Court justified this approach by describing the
objective that preemption jurisprudence must fulfill in the modern regulatory
era:
Our duty to deal with contradictory functions of state and nation on
any occasion ... calls for the utmost effort to avoid conclusions
which interfere with the governmental operations of either. Nothing
could be more fertile for discord, however, than a failure to define
the boundaries of authority. Clashes may and should be minimized by
mutual tolerance but they are much less likely to happen when each
knows the limits of its responsibility. And, it is only reasonable to
assume that the theory of denying inconsistent powers to a state is
based largely upon the benefits to the regulated industry of freedom
from inconsistencies.94

Part III.C.
88. 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
89. Welch, 306 U.S. at 83.
90. Id. at 84.
91. See infra notes 279-83 (discussing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
92. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
93. Cloverleaf Butter Co., 315 U.S. at 169.
94. Id. (emphasis added). For another example of the extent to which state law was to give
way to federal authority, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (recognizing
that a state law regulating grain elevators was preempted even though the state regulatory regime
was more comprehensive). But cf.Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) (companion case
to Santa Fe Elevator Corp.) (holding that Congress did not preclude state regulation which supplements the federal scheme and that any claim of supersedure was premature until the state adop-
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9
It is important to note that in Mintz,95 Napier,96 Welch,97 Patterson,
"
and other seminal preemption rulings such as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.,99 the Court was addressing the relative authority of competing federal
and state administrative regimes. There is much to recommend such an
approach when defining regulatory spheres of influence."u The same, or
similarly broad approaches to preemption were, however, also applied to state
private law within federalized fields. Part of the explanation and justification
for the use of preemption doctrines developed in the regulatory context to
address the preemption of state private law can be traced to the New Deal
policy of replacing state common law with federal administrative authority.

III.

THE RISE OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE

PRIVATE LAW

A. Common Law and the Modern Administrative State
The creation of the federal regulatory state may be characterized, in large
measure, as an attempt to undermine the regulatory regime based on state
common law."°' Opponents of the private law legal regime combined
philosophical and practical criticisms of common law rules and methodology.
1. Philosophical Criticisms of Private Law
Common law judging was associated with the "oracular" theory of
judging, which traces its origins to America's colonial era and "the
predominant jurisprudential assumption that judges merely 'found' the law,
mechanically applying existing rules to new situations. This assumption
fostered an image of judges as oracles who could discover the law's technical
mysteries but who could not influence the content of the law itself."' 2

ted specific rules).
95. Discussed supra note 76.
96. Discussed supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
97. Discussed supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
98. Discussed supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
99. Discussed supra note 94.
100. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
101. "For the New Deal reformers ... the common law was hardly neutral or prepolitical, but
instead reflected a set of explicit regulatory decisions." SuNsTEIN, supra note 2, at 20. Opponents
of state common law challenged its stranglehold on public policy, its conservatism, and its failure
to address a number of areas of policy. Id.
102. WHITE, supra note 33, at 7-8. Professor Sunstein explains:
Seeing the common law status quo as prelegal and neutral, judges (and many others) did
not recognize its principles as a part of a regulatory system at all, but regarded them
instead as the state of nature. Ideas of this sort underlay a number of constitutional decisions which saw departures from common law principles as constitutionally suspect.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 19. Professor White points out that although this approach threatened
to "divorce 'law' from community values," Chief Justice Marshall "developed a technique of
decision-making that retained the oracular style but grounded decisions on appeals to first principles of American civilization." WHITE, supra note 33, at 9. The oracular theory in its "purer" form
retained a significant relevance. It enjoyed a special prevalence under the direction of Justice
Stephen Field. "With Field and those who shared his perspectives.., came an apparent de-em-
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Although the idea that judges somehow "found" and applied rules of natural
law has always had detractors,' 3 the early twentieth century saw the rise of
legal realism,"° which was exceptionally successful in challenging the notion
that common law rules of decision were somehow "neutral" or
prepolitical." 5
Legal realists showed that common law rules were often subtly but
purposefully constructed to achieve certain policy objectives."
This
observation challenged the notion that common law rules should be insulated
from political review." 7 Legal realists pointed out that all rules of law
implicate public interests, even if they only provided the legal rules and basis
for state policing of private agreements.'
This perspective legitimized
attempts by the legislative branches of government, both federal and state, to
reformulate or supplant common law rules."°
2. Substantive Criticisms of Private Law
The substantive criticisms of the common law regime challenged the
content of common law rules. Furthermore, the opponents of the existing legal
regime argued that enforcing legal rights or administrating complex matters

phasis on policy considerations and a professed return to immutable guiding axioms of the law,
axioms that the judges merely applied to the facts before him to reach a sound result" Id. at 107.
103. The tension between natural law and positive law can be traced to the divergent premises
underlying the Declaration of Independence, with its notion of inherent rights, and the constitutional notion that political power derives from explicit choices made by representative institutions.
Chief Justice Marshall is largely credited (or criticized) with interjecting the notion that the judicial branch of the federal government possesses the authority and responsibility to ground its decisions in "first principles" which may not always be found in explicit provisions of positive law.
See, e.g., supra note 12.
104. Professor Friedman explains that legal realism was
ultimately associated with a group of writers in the 1930's, notably Jerome Frank and
Karl Llewellyn. Realism was, in fact, less a philosophy than an attitude. It rejected the
mind-set of judges and scholars of the late nineteenth century who had emphasized legal
logic and purity of concept .... Realist judges and writers were openly instrumental;
they asked: what use is this doctrine or rule?
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 688.
105. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. One basis for the preeminent position of
common law was the view that it occupied a unique and important place in the constitutional
order. Common law "was thought to be both distinct and insulated from the public law system of
electoral representation and legislation." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1232; see also supra
note 12.
106. As Professor Hurst explains, economics constituted the predominant philosophical underpinning for most of the common law work product of state courts. See generally JAMES W.
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM (1956) [hereinafter HURST, COND IONS OF
FREEDOM]. It would be facile to characterize the economic considerations underlying eighteenth,
nineteenth, and early twentieth century common law as laissez faire. As he points out, "[w]here
legal regulation or compulsion might promote greater release of individual or group energies, we
had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of law." Id. at 7. Nevertheless, the free market was a
significant, if not the primary, component of this law.
107. See supra note 102.
108. Professor Hurst explains that much of the legislation during the early twentieth century
sought to improve the administration of private rights defined by state courts, rather than modifying the substance of the rights themselves. To Professor Hurst, this "represented a broader recognition that there was in many of these private controversies a good deal more of the public interest
than the nineteenth century had realized." HURST, supra note 6, at 72.
109. See infra Part III.A.2.
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through two-party lawsuits was an inefficient and inadequate method for
resolving the controversies that arose in a modem industrial democracy.
0
Professors Stewart and Sunstein address this argument in a 1982 article."
They point out that "[w]hen the Republic was created, private law defined a
system of private economic ordering, regulated by the courts.""' Their
article provides a helpful summary of some of the most significant
justifications for moving from a legal regime based on common law regulation
to a system that emphasizes federal administrative authority. They explain that
"the rise of an urban industrial economy has, for several reasons, undermined
'2
the capacity of the common law system to vindicate ... rights."" For
example,
[c]ommon law rules of exchange, designed for face-to-face
transactions, are increasingly inadequate when applied to mass
markets dominated by large firms. Such markets may create acute
disparities in information and bargaining power.
Second, modem industrial society taxes the common law's ability
to define private entitlements. Direct transgressions proscribed by the
common law of trespass give way to complex and collective harms,
such as pollution. The content of common law entitlements must be
redefined, but the task of redefinition is often beyond the capacity of
judges involved in case-by-case decisionmaking.
Third, new types of harms typically affect large numbers of
individuals simultaneously; the impact is large in the aggregate but
small for any individual. Because the costs of litigation are likely to
exceed any individual's expected recovery, private damage actions no
longer deter socially undesirable actions or provide compensation for
violations of entitlements. The alternative-the prophylactic
deployment of injunctive relief-presents courts with discouraging
managerial complexities.
Fourth, it is difficult to ensure uniform treatment of similarly
situated individuals through decentralized private litigation. Such
uniformity became important in the late nineteenth century, when
monopolies such as railroads discriminated among consumers, and is
important today because of heightened concern with race and sex
discrimination.' 13
Even those who did not support the wholesale replacement of state
common law with federal regulation recognized that existing institutions could
not address many of the economic, social, and political conditions in a modem
industrial state." 4 "The failure of the common law to effectively protect entit-

110. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9.
111. Id. at 1232.
112. Id. at 1235.
113. Id. at 1235-36.
114. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957) (chronicling the rise of the New Deal). In his autobiography, Theodore Roosevelt explains such a development in his understanding of the role of courts in an industrial society. In his capacity as a
member of the New York State Legislature, Mr. Roosevelt investigated the conditions surrounding
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lements created a morally based, politically effective demand for the creation
of regulatory agencies5 to safeguard personal security and dignity under
'
industrial conditions."
B. The Rise of the FederalAdministrative State
The federal administrative state forged in response to these concerns did
not conform with Madisonian notions that legislative, executive, and judicial
functions should be separated among three branches of government. 6 and
between state and federal authority." 7 Federal administrators were provided
with quasi-legislative authority to develop policies and quasi-judicial authority
to apply these policies to specific cases. As a result, authority that had been
confined largely to state judiciaries, and less often to federal and state legisla8
tures, was concentrated in a single federal administrative entity."
There were, however, limits to the transformation of governmental
institutions initiated by the New Deal. As noted above, even in many
federalized fields of law, states retain the authority to establish much of the
private law that defines the rights and obligations of individuals." 9 While
this ensures that state policymakers will retain their place as an important
component of our federalism, 2 ' it does not resolve the question of which

the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. Although he was initially opposed to legislation
banning such manufacturing, he reversed his position after he was exposed to the working and
living conditions of those who produce such cigars. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently
declared the law unconstitutional.
It was this case which first waked me to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that
the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to better social
and industrial conditions. The judges who rendered this decision were well meaning
men. They knew nothing whatever of tenement-house conditions; they new nothing
whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor, of three-fourths of their fellow-citizens in
great cities. They new legalism, but not life.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 81 (Charles Scribner's Sons, The Outlook Company
1926) (1913).
115. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1236.
116. This vision of separation of powers is generally associated with James Madison's writing
and advocacy on behalf of the Constitution in the debate over its ratification. "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST
No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
118. As Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out, allowing judges to review the decisions
reached by administrators or supervise (for example through mandate or injunction) the activities
of federal agencies undermines many of the results that were to be achieved through these entities.
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9. Nevertheless, they point out that it is contrary to many of the
principles underlying our federalist system to rely exclusively on bureaucratic decisions for the
assertion and protection of important or fundamental individual rights. As they explain, the creation and expansion of "private correctives" must be balanced to achieve the benefits of both
modem administration and historic notions of individual rights. Id.
119. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as discussed infra notes 175-80
and accompanying text, courts employed the principles of private rights to ensure that individuals
were not totally at the mercy of federal bureaucracies for the enforcement of important personal
liberties and rights.
120. For a discussion of the continued relevance of federalism, see Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917 (1985) [hereinafter Federalism and Rights].
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state laws are preempted and which are preserved. Although courts can often
determine whether competing state regulatory regimes interfere with federal
regulation,' Congress can, at best, provide only general guidance about the
extent that private law might interfere with federal objectives.'
As the volume and breadth of federal administrative authority grew, the
Supreme Court was left to decide whether to create bodies of federal common
law, allow state law to exist within federalized fields of law, or preempt state
law within federalized fields. Often, the Supreme Court opted to broadly
preempt state law, sometimes from entire fields of law.'23 The absence of
greater use of federal common law within federalized fields of law is
perplexing. 24 To be sure, in comparison with federal administrative entities,
common law courts (especially state courts) were found to be inadequate
mechanisms for regulating conduct and the economy. While this comparison

121. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 229-37 (discussing state labor relations laws directed at the same ends as federal labor laws); 253-72 and accompanying text (discussing federal
acts preemption of state "direct" regulation of cigarette warning labels).
122. See supra notes 71-75, infra note 270, and accompanying text. Indeed, the Constitutional
Convention considered and explicitly rejected the idea of providing Congress with the authority to
determine which state laws were compatible with federal programs. Instead, the Supremacy
Clause, leaves courts with the task of developing a methodology for determining which state laws
are incompatible with federal law. Various formulations of the Supremacy Clause that would have
provided Congress with the authority to pass on state laws were considered and rejected. See, e.g.,
Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 5-8. Generally, these proposals were considered too broad if
they provided Congress with the authority "to negative all [state] laws which to them shall appear
improper." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 162 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (1911) (quoting a proposal proffered by Charles Pickney and James Madison). Conversely, they were considered problematic and subject to abuse if the power was only extended to
"such laws only as will encroach on the national government." Id. at 169. Entrusting courts rather
than Congress with the authority to determine whether state law is preempted is significant for
two reasons. First, the Constitution left state courts, which were much more numerous, with the
primary opportunity to resolve questions of preemption. Second, in the late eighteenth century, the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government were seen as the greatest threat to
state authority. As noted above, some members of the Constitutional Convention believed that
Congress might abuse the power to preempt state laws by employing it to resolve minute policy
disputes. Placing this authority in the hands of judges offered the best opportunity to resolve preemption questions in a forum that was less likely to be in direct competition with state policymakers. It also left questions of preemption unresolved until the litigation of actual matters that
Congress may have been tempted to proactively resolve in its favor if it possessed the authority to
declare state law invalid. These factors make it clear that the Supremacy Clause was intended to
balance the need to make federal law supreme with a desire to constrain congressional authority to
preempt state law. For these reasons, an approach to preemption that seeks to empower courts to
preserve state law is more consistent with the history and text of the Supremacy Clause than proposals that seek to make preemption solely a question of Congressional intent. A variant of this
argument is made by Wolfson, supra note 14. See infra note 123. The text of the Supremacy
Clause is set out supra note 30.
123. As one commentator points out, this effectively provides Congress with the ability to
declare an entire field of law federalized. See Wolfson, supra note 14. This constitutes an expansive congressional authority that the Constitutional Convention explicitly chose not to confer upon
Congress. "The [proposed] congressional veto would have permitted Congress to strike down, after the fact, particular laws passed by the states. [Modem p]reemption permits Congress to block
off whole area of legislation and say to the states, 'Here you shall not enter."' Id. at 90.
124. As Professors Stewart and Sunstein explain, at one point during this century, the rise of
federal common law seemed assured. Yet, "[tlhe 'mid-twentieth century type of federal common
law' celebrated by Judge Friendly seems rapidly headed for oblivion." Stewart & Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 1223. Judge Friendly's views concerning federal common law are discussed in the next
section.
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explains the rise of federal administrative authority, it does not fully explain
why federal preemption, rather than federal common law, was employed to
integrate state private law within federalized fields of law.'"
This choice can only be understood in light of changes in the background
assumptions concerning the inherent value of common law and its place in our
constitutional structure along with a reassessment of the authority of federal
courts to participate in the formulation of such common law. The next sections
explain how these developments coincided with the rise of the federal
administrative state and profoundly affected the development of federal
common law in federalized fields of law.
C. The Re-evaluation of Federal Common Law
This section does not seek to comprehensively address the role of
common law in our federal system. When faced with a potential conflict
between federal statutes and state private law, however, federal courts will
generally analyze the matter solely to determine whether the private law is
preempted. Seeking to preserve private law by creating federal common law is
rare. The absence of federal common law may be traced to two sources: (1)
the rise of federal administrative authority, which sought to eliminate the
"system of public law built directly on private law principles" and (2)
prevailing "federalist" interpretation of Erie v. Tompkins,'26 which found
federal common law to be constitutionally questionable use of federal judicial
authority. This section addresses both of these factors and explains why they
should not preclude the use of federal common law as a means of integrating
private law within federalized fields of law.
As professor Field points out, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie is
"widely understood as the case first setting out our modern understanding of
the proper scope of federal common law."' 27 This makes Erie the appropriate
starting point for analyzing the relationship between common law and federal
preemption.
In Erie, the Supreme Court reconsidered and reversed its 1842 decision
Swift v. Tyson.'25 The Court in Swift had ruled that neither the Rules of
Decision Act'29 nor federal deference to state courts required federal courts

125. Both federal common law and federal preemption can be structured to recognize that
federal administrators have the primary responsibility and authority to establish policy. The primary difference between these t%o options concerns the background assumptions concerning relevance of private law in our federalism. See infra Part III.C.
126. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
127. Field, supra note 15, at 902.
128. 41 U.S. (I Pet.) 1 (1842).
129. The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[tlhe laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as the rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)). Professor Field points out that "[tlhis text is the version of the act as it
read at the time of Erie. The phrase 'trials at common law' was changed in 1948 to 'civil actions."' Field, supra note 15, at 902 n.93 (citing Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62
Stat. 869, 944).
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to follow the "general" private law defined by state courts.130 Swift,
therefore, allowed federal courts to define principles of "general" private law
even if they differed from those applied by local tribunals where the federal
court sat. 3' Of course the magnitude of their common law work-product was
limited by the narrow range of federal court jurisdiction,' congressional
authority to define federal court jurisdiction,'33 and a host of self-imposed
restraints, 34 including the Supreme Court's eventual reluctance to address
matters of common law. 33 Nevertheless, the Swift Court did not find a basis
in federal statutes, constitutional mandate, or policy considerations that
required federal courts to apply the "general" common law rules derived by
their state counterparts.'

130. Swift divided state law into the categories of "general" and "local" law, and held that
federal courts were obliged to follow and apply all state statutes and "local" laws. Swift, 41 U.S.
at 18-19. In matters of "general" law, however, federal courts were not required to apply those
rules of decision announced by state courts in the jurisdiction where they sat. Id. Swift's author,
Justice Story, apparently believed that the scope of this "general" federal common law would be
very narrow. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 76264 (1941). The distinction between local and general law proved quite elusive, and even nearly
100 years later, the rule of Swift was susceptible to the criticism that courts had still not developed
"a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
131. Allowing federal courts to chart their own course in this manner raised the obvious criticism that a party could not be aware of what rules of law would be applied to her conduct until
she knew whether she was sued in federal or state court. Professor Field explains that Justice
Story
[aipparently . . . assumed that state courts generally would follow federal decisional law
announced by federal courts ... . [He] was not suggesting that states be required to
follow federal decisional law; he was relying on the persuasive force of federal decisions
on common law issues. Part of his assumption may have rested upon a conception, later
the subject of a famous criticism by [Justice] Holmes, of common law as one system of
rules, "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within
it unless and until changed by statute."
Field, supra note 15, at 900-01 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 278 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
132. Even when federal courts enjoyed broad authority to announce principles of federal common law, the Constitution limited their jurisdiction to cases "arising under" federal law or cases
involving parties of diverse state citizenship. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 13-18. Furthermore, attempts were made to preclude the "manufacture" diversity of citizenship in order to
create the basis for federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 1688-95.
133. For a discussion of congressional authority to define the jurisdiction of federal courts,
see generally MARTIN H. REDISH, TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7-52 (2d
ed. 1990).
134. For example, federal courts continued to assiduously follow and apply each state's property law doctrines. As the Supreme Court wrote in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, "even
when federal common law was in its heyday under the teachings of [Swift] an exception was
carved out for local law of real property." 429 U.S. 363, 379 (1977) (citing United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)).
135. Field, supra note 15, at 901.
136. The Court's ruling in Swift was informed and guided by the notion that there was no
difference between state and federal courts with respect to their authority and duty to define such
common law. Thus, the Swift Court referred to "state tribunals ... called upon to perform the like
functions as ourselves." Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. The Court stated that federal courts must be free to
announce common law principles, at least in the context of what it referred to as "the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." Id. As Professor Field explains, allowing
federal courts to develop common law was viewed by some as a means of establishing national
uniformity in common law rules, especially those addressing commercial matters:
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Swift was largely a product of the "oracular" theory of judging and the
belief that the common law was a body of neutral principles that facilitated,
without defining, public and private conduct.'37 This perception of law was
an application of the nineteenth century notion that the existence of an
independent judiciary was an inherent part of our constitutional order and that
judges merely deciphered immutable legal principles to apply them to specific
cases.' 38 From this perspective, common law rules lacked the imprimatur of
positive law. As discussed above, legal realists challenged the notion that
common law rules constituted inherent, transcendent, or immutable
principles.'
As Professor Amar explains, "the [legal] realists had shown
that the common law of tort had to be made, not found, and ... the
Progressives and New Dealers had demonstrated that the particular choices
made by federal judges in common law tort cases were politically
controversial . ."".'.
Erie embraced one of legal realism's cardinal principles: common law
rules are positive law, just like state statutes. By itself, this may have provideda sufficient basis for the Erie Court to overturn Swift.' 4' Yet Erie did not

When Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court in [Swift v. Tyson], first announced
this system, he apparently thought it would achieve uniformity and that the system he
rejected- [federal courts] following state decisional law in diversity cases-created too
much variation by state. In practice, however, Swift did not result in uniformity. As Erie
discussed, a principal criticism of the Swift system was that under it two different sets of
rules governed primary behavior.
Field, supra note 15, at 900.
137. See supra notes 102-05. As Professor Sunstein writes, these rules were considered "purely facilitative-rather than constitutive--of private arrangements." SU'STEIN, supra note 2, at 18,
138. See supra notes 3, 12. Professor Richard E. Ellis provides helpful insights into the origins of this perception of the place of courts in the government of the United States when he
writes:
Coming as it did during the formative era of American law, the moderate triumph on the
state level in the struggle over judicial reform had far-reaching consequences. It meant,
just as it had on the national level, the establishment in many states of judiciaries which
were both bipartisan and nonpartisan.
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC

249 (1971).
139. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
140. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REV. 688, 695 (1989) (reviewing HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 13).
141. For the reasons discussed at supra notes 87 and 130-31, the rule of Swift had been seriously questioned by the time Erie was decided. Indeed, when the Court decided Erie, federal
courts were already reducing the number of legal issues in which they failed to follow state decisional law. Judge Clark, for example, referred to the Swift rule as "an ancient doctrine, already
tending towards decay and death." Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 295-96 (1946). Also, Justice Brandeis
relied on Professor Charles Warren's research concerning a former draft of the text of the Rules of
Decision Act. Professor Warren pointed out that the original directive was for courts to follow
"the Statute law of the several States in force for the time being and their unwritten and common
law now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the
same, or otherwise." Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 389 (1964) (quoting Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88 (1923)). By contrast, the final version used the phrase "[t]he laws of the several States." Id. As Judge Friendly said: "Warren argued
that the abbreviation was only stylistic." Taken as a whole, the growing erosion of the Swift doctrine, the rise of legal realism, and Professor Warren's research may have provided a sufficient
basis for overturning Swift. There are reasons to believe that the Court did not feel comfortable
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stop at redefining the term "laws" as it was employed by the Rules of
Decision Act. Erie also addressed the federal government's role in the creation
of private law. More accurately, it is necessary to separate what Erie "says"
from what it has been taken to mean. Just as ambiguous phrases in the
Constitution provide a Rorschach test of an observer's views on
federalism,' 42 the Erie decision may be interpreted from either a nationalist
or federalist perspective. From a federalist perspective, Erie was an attempt by
the Supreme Court to preclude the federal judiciary from addressing matters
constitutionally reserved to states.'43 Furthermore, federalists would argue
that Erie accomplished this objective by establishing a general prohibition on
the creation of federal common law, which would be overcome only upon
evidence that Congress intended or directed federal courts to create common
law.'"
From a nationalist perspective, Erie recognizes that although private law
is positive law, it generally addresses matters that can easily be left to
states.' 5 Further, it does no more than eradicate Swift's artificial division
between local and general common law." To bolster this claim, advocates
of this perspective point out that Erie does not even consider what areas may

basing its ruling solely on a reinterpretation of the Rules Act.
[Sitatutory reinterpretation was vulnerable on other grounds. The policy reasons the
Court saw for favoring the change were susceptible to an argument that Swift's statutory
interpretation was so established by the time of Erie that it had become part of the statute through the passage of time; any change based on statute should therefore come
from Congress, not the courts.
Field, supra note 15, at 904 (citing Friendly, supra, at 390-91). This may explain why the Erie
Court felt compelled to consider the constitutional implications of Swift's interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act and then base at least part of its ruling on those implications.
142. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
143. Much of Erie's treatment of the constitutional basis for its ruling evidences a very narrow characterization of federal authority to establish private law, by either federal courts or Congress. For example, the Erie Court stated that under Swift, "federal courts assumed ... the power
to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. Erie also states: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state whether they be ... commercial law or a part of the law of
torts." Id. at 78.
144. For cases applying the federalist approach to common law, see supra note 134 and infra
note 161.
145. Federal court jurisdiction in Erie was based on diversity of citizenship. Erie, 304 U.S. at
71. It was not concerned with "matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress." Id. at 78. Indeed, one commentator wrote in 1941: "It is undoubtedly the fact that even
before this decision was rendered, the federal courts generally tried to discover and apply the
common law of some particular state rather than the common law of all of the states at once. In
most cases they did not see fit to assert or apply [Justice] Story's [Swift] doctrine." Corbin, supra
note 130, at 764.
146. Viewed from this light, Justice Brandeis's famous statement, "[tihere is no general federal common law," means nothing more than that there is no distinction between local law that
federal courts must follow pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act versus general private law that
federal courts may fashion. Simply eliminating this distinction does not begin to consider the
perimeters of federal court authority to establish federal common law based on some federal interest. Recall that the Rules of Decision Act directs federal courts to follow state law "except where
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide." The federalist interpretation of Erie is susceptible to the criticism that it reads too much into a decision
which does not begin to consider the breadth of this important exception. See Field, supra note
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be of sufficient national concern to justify the creation of federal common
law.

47

The federalist interpretation of Erie has come to dominate
jurisprudence." Nevertheless, the nationalist perspective enjoys a number of
advocates who rely on a significant quantity of evidence favoring a narrower
interpretation of Erie. Judge Henry Friendly is one of the most articulate
proponents of the nationalist perspective. Judge Friendly points out that the
Erie Court clearly assumed that federal courts were limited in the number of
areas where they would establish common law.' 49 However, Erie never
sought to define those limits; certainly Erie did not intend to establish the
sweeping limit on federal common law that the case has come to stand
for. 5° The conventional federalist interpretation of Erie is a straightjacket
limiting the ability of federal courts to create federal common law, even
withinfederalized fields of law. As a result, federal courts rely primarily on
preemption to resolve almost all putative conflicts between private law and
federal statutes.' 5'
The absence of federal common law is not, however, due solely to the
dominance of the federalist interpretation of Erie. Advocates of greater federal
authority often viewed the common law as an impediment to their
objectives.'52 Rather than wait for common law to develop as they would

147. For example, on the day it ruled in Erie, the Supreme Court also handed down a decision pursuant to its original jurisdiction, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938), where it applied principles of federal common law to an interstate dispute.
This demonstrates the widespread acceptance, that some areas of law, such as interstate disputes,
are inherently federal and state law has no place within such fields except as incorporated rules of
decision. These federal "enclaves" include the enforcement of contracts with the federal government, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); international relations, see
infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text; and federal Indian law, see, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (I Wheat.) 543 (1823). Professor Charles F. Wilkinson describes the Supreme
Court's decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, as "true" federal common law. CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 142 n.29 (1987). He also argues that in the field of
Indian law, "the federal laws often hold out so little guidance that courts have been forced to look
to such diverse sources of authority that they might as well be making common law." Id. at 12.
The enclaves approach to the authority of federal courts to create federal common law is discussed
and criticized in Field, supra note 15, at 911-15. Similarly, the field of implied rights of action for
the violation of some federal rights has been largely unaffected by the federalist interpretation of
Erie. The federalization of such fields is generally, but not exclusively, constitutional in origin. Id.
148. "The 'mid-twentieth century type of federal common law' celebrated by Judge Friendly
seems rapidly headed for oblivion." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1123 (citations omitted).
149. As Judge Friendly points out, "Erie must be appraised ... in the familiar setting of a
Congress of limited powers, with considerable areas of law-making reserved to the states."
Friendly, supra note 141, at 393-94.
150. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the state ....There is no general federal common law."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Professor Field persuasively argues that this portion of Erie
is highly ambiguous, and even inconsistent, in the scope it suggests for federal common
law. In large part it suggests that the courts lacked power to act simply because their
action went beyond Congress's power. There is some suggestion, though, that the judiciary lacks power to make federal common law generally. No subsequent case has explicitly addressed the tension between these two standards, or otherwise delineated the
appropriate limits of federal common law.
Field, supra note 15, at 905 (emphasis in original).
151. See infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., supra note 101.
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like, they have sought to establish statutory regimes to displace what they
perceive as conservative and slowly developing common law. Often, the same
proponents of preemption then seek to employ common law to expand the
range of the legislation they favored. In many instances, however, their initial
success in superseding common law successfully "salts the field" and they are
prevented from employing common law to achieve their objectives. For
example, environmentalists were frustrated by attempts to employ common
law processes to protect the quality of natural resources.'53 They turned to
the legislative arena and obtained statutes implementing their concerns. If they
become dissatisfied with the pace of the administrative implementation of their
regulatory programs, they turned to common law litigation, 54 often only to
find their adversaries employing federal preemption to defeat their claims.' 5
On a larger scale, this is the dynamic that resulted when the New Deal
and the Erie doctrine limited the sphere of federal common law. The
proponents of the New Deal were initially ecstatic when private law was
replaced by the federal administrative state.'56 Like Mr. Roper in the
colloquy that opens this article, the New Dealers assumed that the federal
administrative state would obviate the need for private law, at least in
federalized fields of law. Soon, however, it became obvious that both federal
administrative authority and federal common law-making would be necessary
to achieve all of their objectives. By that time it was often, but not always, too
late. ' In this respect, preemption proves to be a double-edged sword: it can
eliminate troublesome pre-existing common law doctrines and rapidly thaw the
sometimes glacial process of establishing public policy through private law.
Coupled with the federalist interpretation of Erie, however, it may also
preclude judicial development of statutory themes.

153. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 5.
154. See David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits
for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1989) (arguing that private tort
actions are not inconsistent with federal and state environmental statutes).
155. See id.; see also Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that
the 1972 Clean Water Act displaces state common law). This is not the only dynamic that results
in prohibitions on federal common law. Often opponents of private law simply seize on the federalist interpretation of Erie and field preemption doctrines to preclude judicial work-product. See
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 145.
156. They opposed the entire common law system as a narrow, conservative means of influencing conduct, largely by protecting individual property rights and relying on market forces. See,
e.g., supra notes 8 (discussing the shortcomings of common law) and 114 and accompanying text
(discussing the perspectives and beliefs of the New Dealers). Given the common law's association
with laissezfaire, see supra note 106, there was no apparent contradiction in making private law
the domain of state institutions (even to the point of explicitly stating that Congress was without
authority to establish private law) and simultaneously ratifying the New Deal's expansion of federal authority. Stated another way, New Dealers saw the common law as a legal system that served
a narrow range of (wealth creation) objectives largely without direct regulation. By contrast, the
New Deal reformers sought to accomplish a completely different set of (social welfare) objectives,
and they had no problem providing federal entities with regulatory authority to impose these objectives. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9; supra notes 101-13 and accompanying
text.
157. In some instances, proponents of federal legislation were able to establish federal common law within the fields to act in concert with federal legislation. See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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The absence of federal common law in federalized fields may be traced to
overzealous attempts to establish federal legislation as the preeminent source
of public law coupled with the prevalence of an imprecise and doctrinaireridden federalist interpretation of Erie. Neither of these factors provides a
legitimate basis for excluding private law from federalized fields of law,
especially where federal legislation is primarily created to establish public law
objectives. The second half of this article explores fields of law federalized by
Congress and demonstrates why private law should generally be integrated
into these fields. Before advocating the expansion of the common law powers
of federal courts, it is necessary to directly address the conventional view that
is contrary to the constitutional values of federalism and separation of powers.
D. Limits on Federal Common Law and the Presence of Private Law in
FederalizedFields of Law
Erie's legacy includes two background principles concerning federal
common law that are especially applicable to the choice between federal
common law and preemption as a means of integrating private law in
federalized fields of law. The first of these principles concerns whether
solicitude to state lawmakers requires federal judges to leave (or appear to
leave) questions of private law to state courts. The second concerns the
question of whether common law has an inherent place in our constitutional
structure.
1. Erie, Federal Common Law, and Federalism
Following Erie's lead, the Supreme Court's consideration of federal
common law authority is sensitive to the possibility that federal common lawmaking may be adverse to state authority.' There is, of course, a basis for
such concerns.'59 This article points out, however, that in instances where a
court addresses the preemption of state private law, it should also consider the
possibility of incorporating state private law into a federal common law that
does not interfere with federal legislation. This fine-tuning in the exercise of
federal judicial authority can occur without allowing federal courts to engage
in what Judge Friendly referred to as a "federal [court] poaching on state
preserves. ' ' "W
Indeed, federal courts may enjoy broad common law-making authority in
federalized fields without challenging even the current Supreme Court's
restrictive characterization of federal common law authority 6' and without

158. An exception exists in fields have historically characterized as federalized. See supra
note 147 for a discussion of some of these fields.
159. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
160. Friendly, supra note 141, at 407. Judge Friendly referred to the Swift rule, discussed
supra notes 128-40, which allowed federal courts to create common law rules in areas of law
traditionally understood to be within the competence of state courts.
161. The Supreme Court's restrictive view towards the creation of federal common law is
evidenced by the following cases: Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
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disagreeing with the federalist interpretation of Erie. It is, however, necessary
to question whether restricting the authority of federal courts to define
common law results in greater state participation in the process of defining the
rules of decision employed by federal courts.
Erie was predicated on the assumption that most fields of law would
remain free from the influence of federal legislation.'62 As discussed above,
until the New Deal, judicial limitations and self-restraints kept federal legislation from interfering with state common law ordering.'63 To employ Judge
Friendly's analogy, although pre-New Deal Congresses did not federalize
"state preserves," Swift allowed federal courts to engage in selective
"poaching." The New Deal and Erie effected a dramatic reversal of this
situation. The Erie decision removed federal judges as a source of legal rules
that routinely displaced state common law, while the New Deal began the
federalization of many fields of laws that were historically reserved to states.
The Erie Court, however, failed to anticipate the growth of federal law as
the predominant source of law in the United States. Because courts must rely
on a unique or significant federal interest before creating federal common
law,"6 they may easily find that state private law is preempted, but they are
routinely unable to employ common law processes to create federal private
law that does not threaten federal objectives.
Allowing federal courts to develop federal common law in those instances
where state law would otherwise be preempted does not, by definition, damage
the sphere of state decisionmaking that Erie is interpreted as protecting. 65
Professor Field explains that it is generally assumed that federal common law
is adverse to state interests:
The supposition on which broad federal common lawmaking powers
are detrimental to the scope of state lawmaking authority is that
federal courts may make law more easily, and more readily, than
Congress will, at least in some situations. Indeed, every instance in
which a federal court does exercise this power to make federal
common law is by definition one in which Congress has not acted, so

(1979). For a discussion of several other methods the Supreme Court currently employs to restrict
the ability of federal courts to vindicate rights, along with a criticism of this trend, see Hon.
Stephen Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the Federal Courts: Round up the Usual Victims, 6 WHrTTIER L. REV. 967 (1984).
162. As Judge Friendly points out, "Erie must be appraised... in the familiar setting of a
Congress of limited powers, with considerable areas of law-making reserved to the states ......
Friendly, supra note 141, at 393-94. Judge Friendly assumed that pursuant to Erie, "state courts
must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress ...has manifested, be it ever so lightly, an intention to that end." Id. at 407. (emphasis added). Clearly this is not the case. The "light
tread of Congress" may result in the preemption of state law, but rarely does it result in the creation of federal common law.
163. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 124, 161.
165. Similarly, as discussed in the next subsection, such federal lawmaking by courts is not
necessarily contrary to congressional authority, except in those rare instances where Congress's
failure to provide a specific rule was the result of its decision that a federal rule was not necessary. See Field, supra note 15, at 925.
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therefore every exercise of federal common lawmaking power takes
away power from the states."
In an accompanying footnote Professor Field points out that "[s]tate power is
not reduced, however, if there would otherwise be federal preemption."' 67 In
those instances where state law would be preempted, federal common law
represents an option that can preserve principles of private law that would
otherwise be preempted.
Private law defines many of the obligations and rights of individuals in
our society."' 8 Nevertheless, the principles of field preemption created to
accommodate the rise of federal administrative authority result in the
preemption of entire fields of state law whether or not Congress considered
this result. 69 Often Congressional "intent" to preempt state law is only
"found" by operation to the "background principles" discussed above. 7' As a
result, in many federalized fields, important principles of state common law
are preempted by the combined force of background principles and the assumption that federal common law only advances federal interests. By
contrast, allowing federal courts to incorporate state private law would allow
these principles to continue to have force within federalized fields.
2. Erie, Federal Common Law, and Separation of Powers
The place of common law in our constitutional structure can be addressed
in terms of its implications for separation of powers. To be sure, there is no
indication that the Erie Court considered whether its decision would implicate
the status of federal courts in the constitutional structure.'' Nevertheless,
Erie's ruling that federal courts did not possess the authority to create general
federal common law coincided with rise of the federal administrative state
(with its obvious implications for judicial authority). This created the
to the status of a
possibility that federal courts could literally be relegated
72
"less than equal" branch of the federal government.
More that just nostalgic adherence to Madisonian political theory would
be threatened if federal courts did not exist as a coequal branch of
government. The notion that individuals possess personal human rights and

166. Field, supra note 15, at 925-26.
167. Id. at 926 n.201. As discussed further at infra note 304, some areas of law have become
so federalized that federal courts will allow no state private law within the field. In these cases,
courts have created exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule to allow defendants to remove
proceedings from state to federal court based on the defense of "complete" preemption. Certainly
in these cases the creation of federal common law based on state private law principles does not
reduce state authority.
168. See, e.g., supra note 12.
169. See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text; see also supra note 17.
171. Indeed, for a number of years after Erie was decided, commentators were only concerned
with the questions of federalism it raised. "Intent on meeting the Erie charge, Judge Friendly did
not adequately address the equally serious intramural question-the authority of federal courts in
relation to that of Congress." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1224.
172. "The grant of extensive lawmaking authority to administrative bodies deprived the courts
of much of ,their established dominion, granted vast responsibilities to bureaucratic entities not
anticipated in the Constitution, and undermined the separation of powers." Id. at 1233.
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interests that can not be abrogated by the government or by private individuals
without the opportunity for private judicial redress is an important
philosophical component of our federalism.'73 This belief is at least as
important as the other "background principles" that lie at the heart of much of
the jurisprudence concerning preemption, federal common law, and other
constitutionally ambiguous matters.'74 Furthermore, the existence of a
judiciary with the authority to define, develop, and protect these interests is an
important component of our federalism.
Professors Stewart and Sunstein argue that courts, especially federal
courts, were able to preserve their place within the post-New Deal
Constitutional order by creating or expanding the following remedies: private
rights of action (actions against third parties for violating statutory rules);
private rights of initiation (actions against agencies of the federal government
for failing to exercise the full range of their authority); "new" property rights
hearings (procedural protections for recipients of social programs); and private
rights of defense (actions against federal agencies for overreaching their
constitutional and/or statutory authority). They explain that each of these
"second order" remedies "raises the same basic question of the ability and
authority of courts to engraft
private correctives onto a statutory system of
7
public administration. 5
The primary motivation, then, for creating these second order
remedies-and consequently, the focus for their justification-is the need to
preserve the values inherent in separation of powers among the branches of
the federal government.7 7 To be sure, these remedies are deeply rooted in
important Anglo-American notions of law, constitutionalism, and equity. For
example, the personal nature of some of these rights requires that the
individual must not be completely at the mercy of bureaucratic decisions over
whether and how these rights will be asserted and protected. To do otherwise,
the professors point out, would be contrary not only to (sometimes implicit)
notions of constitutional order, but also the basic premises of Anglo-American
law. As a result, one significant factor in determining whether private redress
to courts will exist concerns the particular status or type of private interest that
is implicated. For example, Stewart and Sunstein note:
When litigants seek to protect important personal liberties, such as
freedom from discrimination, courts often create both initiation rights
and rights of action. By contrast, when an agency has been granted
broad discretion in an area such as regulation of rates and competitive
practices, courts are likely to deny both private remedies.'77
Nevertheless, "institutional considerations" are the focus of judicial approach
in deciding whether to participate in policymaking through one of the second
order remedies. "' As a result, Stewart and Sunstein write that "basic

173.
174.
175.

See supra note 12; infra note 181.
The nature of this ambiguity is discussed supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1198.

176. This observation is explored in greater detail infra Part

177. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1217-18.
178. See id. These "institutional considerations" include:

lV.C.
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conceptions of judicial role and institutional purpose . . . played the central
role in the development of alternative systems of public and private
enforcement."' 79 Thus, although federal courts continue to recognize, allow,
and occasionally encourage private parties to bring lawsuits that concern
policy areas addressed by federal regulatory programs, it would be inaccurate
to characterize this as an attempt by federal courts to replace or integrate state
law that has been (or would be) preempted by federal programs. Instead, these
second order remedies are more accurately characterized as attempts by the
federal judiciary to counter-balance congressional and federal administrative
authority.
This article is more concerned with private law within federalized fields
of law than second order remedies created to maintain the status of the judicial
branch of government. (Although in the case of private rights of action it may
be impossible to define an exact dividing line.) Indeed, much of the
Constitutional overtones raised by second order remedies is irrelevant to the
discussion of private law within federalized fields. Professor Field points out
the creation of federal common law "cuts down on congressional power only
if congressional failure to act represents a congressional judgment that no
federal lawmaking should exist.''8 °
IV. CONTRASTING MODELS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN FEDERAL COMMON

LAW, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, AND STATE LAW

Since the rise of the federal administrative state, courts have applied three
mechanisms for integrating private law into federalized fields of law: field
preemption, allowing state law to "operate of its own force," and federalizing
state private law principles. The second half of this article considers each of
these approaches based on the criteria of separation of powers, federalism, and
the "background assumptions" they implicate.

the limited analytic and factfinding capacities of courts, the need for consistency and
coordination in enforcement, and the comparatively greater political accountability of
agencies. Courts have also given varying weights to certain regulatory goals: effective
implementation of administrative programs, compensation of those injured by statutory
violations, and the need to adjust regulatory objectives in light of implementation problems and changing public attitudes. The variations among judicial decisions during any
given period might be explained by variations in the particular regulatory programs involved and in the particular beneficiary interests asserted. The differences in judicial
approach over time might be understood as a response to shifting judicial perceptions of
the weight to be accorded institutional considerations on the one hand and regulatory
objectives on the other.
Id. at 1218.
179. Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). In the creation of some private causes of action within
federalized fields of law, courts considered whether it would be more appropriate to allow state or
federal courts to define the rights of action. See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text. Unfortunately this approach has not resulted in a recognition that federal courts must be the source of
federal common law in some instances.
180. Field, supra note 15, at 925.
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A. Finding a Field of Law Federalized to the Exclusion of State Law: Field
Preemption
For a number of reasons, federal courts may choose to find that a legal
question is federalized to the exclusion of state law and opt not to create
federal common law to address issues left unresolved in the statutory scheme.
Such a decision may be tailored narrowly, to address only a specific legal
question, or it may encompass a broad field. In some instances, removing state
law from a broad field of law has a constitutional basis. Such decisions are
best viewed in light of the "negative" purposes of the U.S. Constitution. The
view that the Constitution creates a number of "positive" directives to the
federal government to address matters of public policy and social concern
stands in marked contrast with some of the initial perceptions and purposes
behind the Constitution's drafting and adoption. 8 ' An important first
principle for the Constitution was the removal of state interference with
interstate commerce, foreign relations, relations with Indian nations, private
contracts, and related (generally) commercial concerns, without necessarily
creating an active federal involvement in any of these areas.'82 The body of
law known as the "dormant commerce clause,"'8 3 along with a number of
Indian law doctrines, are the most long-standing manifestations of this principle. ' 4 In such fields of law, the Constitution provides the basis for the
preemption of state law, whether or not Congress has chosen to legislate." 5
Further, in these areas, the argument that state law has a great deal to
contribute often loses much of its force.' 86 For this reason, there is

181. One legal historian notes that the U.S. Constitution may be seen as a triumph of those
who wished to divest state governments, which were more susceptible to popular control, of authority that could hinder commercial development: "The vulnerability of the state governments to
popular control was a principal motive behind the movement for a strong national govemment ....The adoption of the Constitution, with its numerous restraints upon the political and
economic activities of the states, was an important victory of the American commercial community." EuS, supra note 138, at 270-71.
182. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17. In a 1967 article, Professor Hill argued that there are at
least four areas where state law is preempted by the force of the Constitution: interstate controversies, admiralty cases, cases involving a proprietary interest of the United States, and international
law. Hill points out that congressional action is not required to federalize these areas of law to the
exclusion of state law. See generally Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
183. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding Iowa
statute barring use of trucks longer than 60 feet on interstate highways violative of the Commerce
Clause).
184. In the field of federal Indian law, the inherent sovereignty of tribal govemments also acts
to preempt state law. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
185. The interests of federalism make the Supreme Court decidedly reluctant to find fields of
law inherently federalized. For example, in his dissent in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987), Justice Powell argued that as a result of the Property Clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2, preemption should apply with special force on public
lands. California Coastal Comm'n, 480 U.S. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Instead, the Supreme Court applied "traditional" preemption analysis to conflicts between
federal and state law concerning the public lands. See id. at 594. For a defense of this approach
with respect to public lands other than tribal lands, see Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional
Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145, 153, 164 (1982) (arguing that state law should not be presumptively
preempted on federal public lands, as it should be on federal tribal lands).
186. See, e.g., the discussion of the presence of state law in the field of foreign affairs infra
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substantially less of a need for federal common law to incorporate state private
law and there may be no basis for state law operating of its own force.
By contrast, because of the importance of common law in providing
background principles, where there is no constitutional basis for such a
decision, such a barrier to state law should only be used sparingly, even within
the context of relatively comprehensive federal statutory schemes.
1. "Field Preemption" in the Constitutional Context
The Court's decision in Hines v. Davidowitz"7 provides a starting point
for this discussion. This case concerned a challenge to a Pennsylvania law
requiring aliens to register with the state and establishing penalties for failing
to do so.' The Court's decision is not grounded in either conflict or field
occupation preemption.'89 Congress had evidenced no intent to occupy this
field." The Court pointed to a number of compelling reasons to limit
federal regulation of this field to the existing federal regime. Not the least of
these reasons concerned the many reciprocal agreements with other countries
promising that any of their citizens "residing in our territory shall not be
singled out for the imposition of discriminatory burdens.""' The Court did
not address how Pennsylvania's law impinged on any particular agreement or
series of agreements. If the Court had decided this case on such "conflict"
grounds, it would have faced a plethora of challenges to state alien registration
laws." State laws struck down for their conflict would be rewritten and
challenged until the state produced a law that could pass the standard
developed by the Supreme Court. This would certainly have absorbed a large

notes 187-203 and accompanying text.

187.

312 U.S. 52 (1941).

188. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59-60.
189. Indeed, after reviewing all of the tests employed to analyze preemption, the Court declined to specify which it was applying. Instead, it wrote that "[iln the final analysis, there can be
no one crystal clear test distinctly marked [preemption] formula." Id. at 67.
190. Justice Stone pointed out in his dissent "that Congress was not unaware that some
nineteen states have statutes or ordinances requiring some form of registration for aliens, seven of
them dating from [World War I]." Id. at 79 (Stone, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 69.
192. At several places in its opinion, the Court refers to constitutionally questionable bills
dealing with alien registration which Congress chose not to enact. See, e.g., id. at 71. The Court
was clearly pleased that Congress chose to adopt what it termed a "middle path" and troubled that
state legislatures might fail to be similarly circumspect. By preempting state law from this field,
the Court spared federal courts from having to review the work of state legislatures that would fail
to adopt what the Court considered the appropriate "middle path." As a former elected official, the
opinion's author, Justice Hugo Black, was undoubtedly familiar with the pressure on state legislators to stray from this path. Id.
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amount of judicial time. 93 In an area where state laws have little to
contribute, such an approach is appropriate.
Hines completely swept state law from any involvement in the field of
alien registration.'94 The Court held out no hope that even narrowly drafted
state laws would be exempt from this ruling. This result is entirely appropriate
because there is no need for state law to operate of its own force in this field,
nor is there any need for federal law to incorporate private law principles
within this field. To be sure, if there were some need for distinct common law
principles concerning the subject matter of this field-resident aliens-it
would be appropriate for federal courts to create such common law, perhaps
borrowing from state private law principles. In the absence of the need for a
unique federal common law in this field, broad federal preemption is
appropriate in order to remove state law and to leave the entire field to the
interaction between Congress and federal courts.'95
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson'96 the Court was faced with another situation
where failing to federalize a field of law would produce an avalanche of
conflicting state laws that federal courts would have to sort through to
determine how they could fit within a field where state law has little to
contribute in terms of background principles.' 97 Specifically, Nelson
concerned one of the many state sedition laws that grew out of the period of
national hysteria commonly referred to as the "McCarthy Era." In its decision
to prevent states from enforcing laws that prohibited sedition against the
federal government, the Court pointed out:
Forty-two States plus Alaska and Hawaii have statutes which in some
form prohibit advocacy of the violent overthrow of established
government. These statutes are entitled anti-sedition statutes, criminal
anarchy laws, criminal syndicalist laws, etc. Although all of them are
primarily directed against the overthrow of the United States
Government, they are in no sense uniform. . . . Some of these Acts

193. The Supreme Court is appropriately concerned with the question of whether its decisions
will resolve legal questions in a manner that leaves lower courts with principles amenable to consistent application or whether they will require lower courts to continually revisit state compliance
with federal standards. For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial magistrate to "promptly" determine whether probable
cause existed when an individual is arrested without a warrant. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court adopted a rule that assumes that such determinations
comply with Gerstein if they occur within 48 hours. In defense of this standard the Court wrote,
"[u]nfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have demonstrated, it is not enough to
say that probable cause determinations must be 'prompt.' This vague standard simply has not
provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and
county practices .... " McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-56.
194. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
195. Federal court participation in this field is necessary because federal courts may review
federal policies to ensure that they conform with due process and other constitutional considerations.
196. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
197. The decision's failure to fit within existing preemption jurisprudence was immediately
apparent, leaving commentators with the task of attempting to define the source, scope, and justification for the Court's decision. See, e.g., Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 209 (1959).
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are studiously drawn and purport to protect fundamental rights by
appropriate definitions, standards of proof and orderly procedures in
keeping .

.

. Others are vague and are almost wholly without such

safeguards.
concurrent
encounter..
engendered

... Should the States be permitted to exercise a
jurisdiction in this area, federal enforcement would
. [administrative inconsistency and] the added conflict
by different criteria of substantive offenses. 9

It is difficult to characterize this decision as an implementation of
congressional will. Congress was aware of the volume of existing sedition
laws. It chose to leave these laws intact."' Nevertheless, the decision may be
easily defended with reference to the same separation of powers, federalism,
and institutional dialogue arguments that justify the decision in Davidowitz.
There is widespread support for the notion that preemption analysis should
favor the unimpeded application of federal law within those fields of law that
are specifically committed to the federal government by the Constitution."
Indeed, even commentators who argue that the Supreme Court has been too
"eager" in its assistance of congressional domination of the policymaking
process,2"' argue that the current approach to preemption "has prompted
courts to give too little preemptive effect to the most important federal interests"2"2 Furthermore, the notion that some matters of public policy are
uniquely federal comports with the historical notion that the federal government has limited powers and the concomitant view that all other areas of
public policy are reserved to the states.2" 3
2. "Field Preemption" of State Private Law by Federal Statutes
As described in the first half of this article, the preemption analysis
accompanying the rise of federal administrative authority allowed courts to
remove competing state regulatory regimes from those fields federalized by
congressional programs.2 Federal courts were also faced with state common
law within these federalized fields. By revealing the regulatory nature of state
common law, the legal realists provided one basis for the removal of state
common law.20 5 Yet common law serves a number of purposes in addition to
its regulatory role."3 As a result, it is rarely appropriate to completely

198.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1956).

199. "Congress has not, in any of its statutes relating to sedition, specifically barred the exercise of state power to punish the same Acts under state law." Id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
200. See generally Hill, supra note 182.
201. Wolfson, supra note 14, at 112.
202. Id. at 103 (referring to DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which upheld a state law
forbidding the employment of illegal aliens).
203. While this principle was unanimously recognized in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), there was significant disagreement among the members of the
Court over the role of the federal judiciary in preserving the sovereign fights of states. Id. at 580
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. See supra Part II.B.
205. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
206. For example, Professor Steven Smith persuasively argues that private tort law not only
compensates victims, deters certain conduct, and punishes tortfeasors, but also serves to "reaffirm[] those [social] norms that make rational society possible." Steven D. Smith, The Critics and
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eliminate common law from federalized fields, even where federal statutes are
relatively comprehensive.2"'
Where Congress does not consider or explicitly address questions of
private law within federal statutory schemes, courts are unable to trace
preemption decisions to congressional intent.2 8 Evidence of congressional
intent is, of course, not necessary where there is a direct conflict between state
and federal laws.2" Such "direct" conflict, however, is most common where
state legislation creates a competing regulatory regime. When courts are
presented with the hypothetical or attenuated impact of state common law on
federal policies, they must often rely on their own background assumptions to
determine whether there is an adequate basis for preemption."'
The application of background assumptions to preemption analysis and
similar constitutionally ambiguous matters is an inherent and, at least for that
reason, a legitimate exercise of judicial authority. 2" ' Dramatic swings in
preemption analysis occur, however, when these assumptions are applied
within the context of choosing between allowing state law to "operate of its
own force" or completely preempting state private law principles. Jurists that
tend to favor state authority allow state law to operate of its own force,
notwithstanding the impact of this law on federal policies. 22 By contrast,
courts that favor federal authority preempt state law based on the mere
possibility that it will interfere with federal objectives. 3 As a result of this
dynamic, general trends in preemption analysis are discemable, but do not
provide principled guidance for practitioners, courts, commentators, or Congress." 4 By choosing between preemption and allowing state law to operate
of its own force, preemption decisions often go too far-when they preempt
state laws based on a mere possibility that they might interfere with federal
policies--or not far enough-where they allow some interference with federal
objectives. Even where state private law seeks to regulate conduct, there is
still a basis for preserving state common law to the extent that some aspects of

the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 781
(1987). In this respect, Professor Smith shows that tort law not only punishes tortfeasors, but it
also allows society to close ranks with and support those who are harmed when social norms are
violated.
207. "Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised ifa legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way." Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 93-94
(Marshall, J., concurring).
208. See supra note 17.
209. The Supremacy Clause has historically been interpreted as preempting at least those state
laws that directly conflict with federal statutes. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
210. The influence of background assumptions in the preemption context is demonstrated by
the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of state laws limiting the driving privileges of federally discharged bankrupts who have not compensated the victims of their tortuous conduct. Compare Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, Fin. Responsibility Div., 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (finding that operation of the state's financial responsibility law is not preempted by federal bankruptcy
act) with Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (finding operation of the state's financial responsibility law preempted by federal bankruptcy act).
211. For a discussion of the pervasive influence of background principles, see supra notes 3261 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., infra note 240 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., supra note 24.
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the law may be separated and preserved. For example, one of the most
important functions served by state common law-which is rarely addressed
by federal regulatory regimes-concerns the compensation of victims of torts
committed by the entities regulated by federal law.215
The Supreme Court generally employs federal preemption to determine
whether and to what extent state private law may exist within federalized
fields.2 6 Also, the Court often seeks to rely on congressional intent to
determine whether state law is preempted. The resulting jurisprudence often
fails to implement congressional intent because there is rarely any "intent" to
implement.2 7 Where the Court does find that state law is preempted, the
result is often at odds with the long-standing principle that courts will provide
a remedy to redress wrongs and for asserting legal rights."' Finally, where
state law is allowed to "operate of its own force," there is often a question of
the extent to which state law may be applied independent of federal objectives.
This subsection addresses preemption decisions that preempt too great an area
through the use of field preemption or related doctrines. The following
subsection looks at instances where courts appear to allow state laws to
operate of their own force in federalized fields. Part IV.C. then provides
examples of instances where private law has been federalized.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is a case study in the
characterization of New Deal legislation as an attempt to replace common law
ordering with federal regulatory authority. 2 9
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a
comprehensive national labor law, entrusted for its administration and
development to a centralized, expert agency was the perceived
incapacity of common law courts and state legislatures, acting alone,
to provide an informed and coherent basis for stabilizing labor
relations conflict ....
Without question, Congress federalized the field. Congress did not address the
place of private law within this federalized field. 22' The NLRA establishes a
procedure for the negotiation of contracts between union and management
representatives. In order to ensure the consistent interpretation of such
contracts, eliminate common law doctrines that would frustrate federal
objectives, and based on the putative intent of Congress, the Supreme Court
directed courts to create a federal common law for the interpretation of these

215. This is true of the federal programs discussed infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., infra notes 229-72 (discussing unfair labor practices and cigarette warning
labels).
21' 7. See supra note 17 (quoting Solicitor General Cox).
218. See supra notes 12 and 180 and accompanying text (discussing the principle that private
law will provide such remedies).
219. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
220. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
221. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). As Justice
Frankfurter wrote with respect to federally defined unfair labor practices, "[mI]any of these problems probably could have not been ... foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined." Id. at 240.
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contracts.222 State courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to interpret and
enforce these contracts." 3 They must apply the same federal common law of
federal labor relations created by federal courts.22 4
The NLRA precludes the use of "unfair labor practices" by unions to
increase membership or by management to prevent the creation or expansion
of unions.225 Many principles of state private law were found to address
matters within the fields of unfair labor practices. In some instances, state laws
were fashioned to address the same concerns that induced Congress to prohibit
unfair labor practices. 226 Even where these state laws sought to accomplish
the same objective as their federal counterparts, they were often preempted
from the field because they constituted competing regulatory regimes. In other
instances, individuals sought judicial enforcement of private rights to either
advance their cause in a labor dispute or in an attempt to assert the private
interests protected by private law doctrines. Where states constructed
analogous regulatory regimes, courts could easily employ the preemption
principles developed to ensure that state regulation would not interfere with
federal primacy.227 Cases involving private law have proved more problematic.
Instances where individuals assert private rights within federalized fields
are problematic because private law generally serves both a regulatory or
public law purpose as well classical private law objectives. 2 When a court's
approach to this quandary goes no further than determining whether state law
should be preempted, it essentially chooses between retaining the private law
principles inherent in state law, notwithstanding the impact they may have on
federal regulation, or preempting state law and thereby eliminating private law
principles that Congress may have never intended or considered disrupting. To
be sure, in instances where there is a direct conflict between state and federal
laws, reference to congressional intent is unnecessary. Where the impact is
more attenuated, however, this approach requires courts to either err on the
side of preserving state law or federal authority. Such a choice will certainly
be resolved with reference to the background assumptions discussed above.
Rather than approaching this choice purely as a question of preemption,
courts could determine which elements of private law are appropriately
preempted and which can be retained without interfering with federal
objectives or how state private law could be applied with sensitivity to federal
objectives. The result would be a distinct federal common law applying private
law in a manner sensitive to federal labor policy.

222. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
223. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962).
224. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). The original LMRA prohibited unfair labor practices by the
management of businesses engaged in interstate commerce. The Act was amended in 1947 to
prohibit specified practices of labor unions. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-196 (1994)).

226. See, e.g., the state statute under consideration infra notes 229-37.
227. See id.
228. See Smith, supra note 206, at 779-83.
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Rather than utilizing a common law methodology, the Supreme Court
employed preemption to determine whether certain categories of state law
would be preempted within the field. This meant that some claims based on
state private law were precluded because of the mere possibility that state law
might interfere with federal objectives. By contrast, relying on federal
common law provided an alternative that would have preserved such claims
without unduly interfering with federal objectives.
Garner v. Teamsters229 and San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon [hereinafter Garmon 11]" are lodestar cases on the integration of
state private law within federalized fields. In these cases the Supreme Court
chose to employ field preemption rather than federal common law methods for
integrating state law. In Garner, the Supreme Court recognized that valuable
reasons exist for distinguishing between public and private law. The Court
considered whether this distinction could be the basis for preserving some
state law within federalized fields. At issue was whether state laws and institutions could address matters that might constitute "unfair labor practices." The
Court noted that the legislative discussion of the NLRA emphasized the
Board's responsibility to "act[] in the public interest and not in vindication of
purely private rights .... " The Court conceded that public rights are "so
distinct and dissimilar from the private right that federal occupancy of one
field does not bar the state from continuing to exercise its conventional equity
powers over the other."23 ' Yet the Court stated:
such distinction between public and private law is less sharp and
significant in this country, where one system of law courts applies
both, than in the Continental practice which administers public law
through a system of courts separate from that which deals with
private law questions. Perhaps in this country the most usual
differentiation is between the legal rights or duties enforced through
the administrative process and those left to enforcement on private
initiative in the law courts.232
The Garner Court recognizes that there is no obvious functional or
institutional distinction between public and private law. Often a single private
law principle simultaneously serves both public purposes by, for example,
encouraging the use of resources, and private objectives, such as protecting a
single individual's claim to those resources.233
Because state law often serves both private and public law objectives,
courts should be sensitive to the possibility that private law aspects may be
salvaged, even if regulatory aspects must be preempted. Under a common law
approach, a court would employ this analysis to determine which regulatory
elements of state law are preempted by the federal scheme and which private

229. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
230. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) [hereinafter Garmon 11].
231. See Garner, 346 U.S. at 492-93.
232. Id. at 495-96 (citing W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 345 (2d ed. 1949) and RIGHT HON.
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 95-98 (6th ed. 1929)).
233. See HURST, CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 106.
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law elements can be retained. In Garner, however, "neither the statutory
language nor the opinion of the [state] Supreme Court warranted a conclusion
'
that the [state] statute protected private rights"234
The state statute plainly
constituted a competing state regulatory regime and not a private law measure.
The state law at issue in Garner raised no question of how state private
law principles were to be integrated within a federalized field.235
Nevertheless, the GarnerCourt waxed philosophical on the proper relationship
between state private law and federal public law,"' writing that the NLRA,
like other federal law, "has largely developed and expanded as public law"
and that such public law was created to "substitut[e] federal statute law applied by administrative procedures in the public interest in the place of individual suits in courts to enforce common-law doctrines of private right...
[even in instances where an] Act did not expressly abolish the pre-existing
'
private rights."237
Six years later, in Garmon 11,238 the Supreme Court continued wrestling
with the question of what methods and principles were appropriately employed
to determine the proper spheres of federal and state authority in this field. In a
thoughtful opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter acknowledged that those areas
"withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed
metes and bounds. 239 The Court's approach, however, was not to address
state private law as if it contained elements of both private and public law.
Instead, the Court treated all state law as public law and divided the field of
unfair labor practices between those areas that could be addressed by both
state and federal law and those regulated solely by federal law. As a result, in
those areas where state law was allowed to operate, its regulatory objectives
were given force notwithstanding any inconsistency with federal policies.
Conversely, state law was preempted even where it might not interfere with
federal law, simply because the area was deemed to be exclusively federal.
State law was excluded even though its private law functions might have been
integrated into the field with or without modification.
From its very inception, the problems with this "all or nothing" approach
were apparent. First, the Supreme' Court left states free to apply tort law
within the field of unfair labor practices "to grant compensation for the
consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by
violence and imminent threats to the public order." 2"

234. Garner, 346 U.S. at 497.
235. See id. at 487-91. Furthermore, the Court assumed that the NLRB possessed jurisdiction
over the controversy and that the NLRB would exercise that jurisdiction if it were properly invoked. The need to integrate state law was not present in that case for any reason. Id.
236. See id. at 496-99. Indeed, the Court's decision in Garner contains a number of axiomatic
statements regarding the preemption of private causes of action that interfere with federal programs. There is, of course, no question that state laws must give way when they conflict with federal policies. Id.
237. Id. at 496-97 (referring to the Interstate Commerce Act). This statement recognizes that
questions of preemption can not be resolved solely upon express congressional statements. Instead,
recourse must be made to the background principles previously discussed. See supra Part l1.A.
238. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
239. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 240.
240. Id. at 247. The Court justified this ruling "because the compelling state interest, in the
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Having completely opened the gates to these suits, however, the Court
precluded suits based upon any other common law doctrine. The Court readily
conceded that this approach would often prove overly-broad. "It may be that
an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the
active assertion of federal authority."24 Significantly, the Court also conceded that there was no statutory basis for allowing all of one type of (tort)
claim, while preempting all other private law causes of action. Four members
of the Court wrote separately to point out that it was more appropriate to
allow private law claims for actions that Congress deemed "unprotected" and
to preempt only those involving protected actions as defined by the
NLRA.242
In Garmon 11 the Supreme Court characterized most state causes of action
for damages as preempted forms of regulation. 43 In Garmon 11, the Court
chose not to distinguish between those elements of state common law that
could be retained by common law methods and those that had to be
preempted. Instead, the Court determined that state and federal laws
concerning the same conduct, even for different purposes, presented too much
risk of conflict.2" As a result, even those elements of state common law that
might have been integrated into the federal scheme were preempted. The Court
wrote that its "governing consideration is that to allow States to control
activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a
245
danger of conflict with national labor policy.,
In the context of unfair labor practices, the Court asserted that in the
absence of explicit congressional guidance concerning preemption, some rule
capable of relatively simple application was required. In Amalgamated
Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge,24 Justice Harlan addressed the choices available to the Court.
The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve
those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been
determined by the Congress. This has, quite frankly, left the Court
with few available options. We cannot declare pre-empted all local
regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex
interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions,
obviously much of this is left to the States. Nor can we proceed on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether each particular final judicial

scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence
of clearly expressed congressional direction." Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has evinced a
reluctance to recognize that state criminal law is preempted. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that the state "record piracy" law was not preempted by federal copyright law); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (holding that a state criminal law was not
preempted by the existence of federal law, even though the federal law defined its penalty as the
"maximum" and the state statute provided for a more severe penalty).
241. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 247.
242. Id. at 250-51 (Harlan, Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, J.J., concurring).
243. See id. at 239 (characterizing the Court's decision as such a choice).
244. Id. at 242-43.
245. Id. at 246.
246. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
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pronouncement does or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in
some relevant manner with federal labor policy. This court is
illequipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates that
this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy
application, so that lower courts may largely police themselves in this
regard.247
In application, Justice Harlan's approach was to assume that any legal question
that might address a concern within this area of federal labor law would be
contrary to federal labor policy. As a result, much of the state law that might
"touch or concern" labor relations was indeed preempted. For example,
Lockridge concerned a former union member's claim against a union for
revoking his membership in a manner that violated the express terms of the
union's bylaws. His claim was based on state contract and tort law. It was
possible for a court to recognize Mr. Lockridge's claim based on state tort law
without interfering with federal labor relations law."' State law was
preempted without a clear showing that it posed such a threat to federal
objectives or an attempt to apply common law processes to preserve the basic
private law interest at stake. Furthermore, there is much evidence to contradict
Justice Harlan's view that preemption-based jurisprudence is easier to apply
than the other option addressed by the Court's decision: a "federalized judicial
system."249 Three leading figures in federal labor law write that "[n]o legal
issue in the field of collective bargaining has been presented to the Supreme
Court more frequently in the past thirty years than that of preemption of state
law, and perhaps no other legal issue has been left in quite as much
confusion."25
One explanation for the Court's failure to give greater weight to the
possibility that federal common law could be employed to preserve state
private law was a preoccupation with the need to minimize state interference
with new federal regulatory entities. This was certainly the justification most
commonly employed by the Court.'
Another explanation lies in the
assumption, frequently traced to Erie, that by precluding federal courts from
creating federal common law, state courts will enjoy a greater scope of
authority.252 Yet these principles do not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that broad field preemption, rather than the creation of federal common law,
should be a predominant mechanism for the integration of state law in federalized fields of law. As noted above, federal common law is not necessarily
antagonistic to federal administrative authority. Also, where state law is

247. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 289-90.
248. See id. at 321-22 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 413 to illustrate Congress's
instruction that "fnlothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member
of a labor organization under State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under
the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization"). Justice White noted that, "far from preempting state law, one of the major thrusts of the LMRDA was to enforce state rights and remedies." Id. at 323.
249. Id. at 288.
250. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 895 (10th ed. 1986).
251. See, e.g., Garmon H, 359 U.S. at 241-44.
252. See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
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preempted, the creation of federal common law does not intrude into an area
where state law would otherwise apply. Nevertheless, the Garmon 1I
characterization of state common law as nothing more than a means of state
regulation still prevails.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.253 is a recent example of the Supreme
Court's attempt to "integrate" state private law within a federalized field using
preemption. The case involves state common law tort claims against a
cigarette manufacturer brought by the estate of a woman who died of lung
cancer.254 The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether and to what
extent the plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal laws enacted in 1965
and 1969 to address cigarette warning labels and advertising. Specifically, the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 ("The 1965 Act")
"mandated warnings on cigarette packages, but barred the [Federal Trade
'
Commission's] requirement of such warnings in cigarette advertising."255
The
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("The 1969 Act") "strengthened
the warning label, in part by requiring a statement that cigarette smoking 'is
dangerous' rather than it 'may be hazardous.' Second, the 1969 Act banned
cigarette advertising in 'any medium of electronic communication subject to
[FCC] jurisdiction.""56
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's tort claims based on the state
common law principles of failure to warn, violation of an express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud, were all preempted by
the 1965 and 1969 Acts, which sought, among other things, to "protect[] the
national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform and
'
confusing cigarette, labeling and advertising regulations."257
Even though
both statutes explicitly address preemption, the Supreme Court failed to
produce a majority opinion with respect to the preemption of state common
law by the 1969 Act.25
The entire Court agreed that both federal Acts preempt "direct" state
regulation of cigarette advertising and warning labels.25 9 Seven members of

253. 500 U.S. 504 (1992).
254. Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 509 (noting that Mrs. Cipollone, the original plaintiff, died during
the litigation).
255. Id. at 514 (citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)).
256. Id. at 515 (citing the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,
§ 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (1969)).
257. Id. at 519 (citing the 1965 Act's statement of purpose).
258. Id. at 507. Those portions of Justice Stevens's opinion holding that the 1965 Act did not
preempt state tort law were joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter. See id. at 508-31. However, Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter dissented from the
plurality holding that the 1969 Act preempted some principles of state common law. See id. at
531-44. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented entirely. In their view, both the 1965 and 1969 Acts
preempted the state common law claims at issue. See id. at 544-56.
259. See id. at 508-56. Two Justices found this objective in both the 1965 and 1969 Acts and
found that it applied to both "direct" state regulatory law and to state common law; four Justices
found this with respect to both Acts as they applied to "direct" state regulation and the 1969 Act
as it applied to specific principles of state common law; and three Justices found this with respect
to both Acts as applied to "direct" state regulation, but that neither Act preempted the state common law principles under review in the suit.
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the Court agreed that the following provision in the 1965 Act worked no
preemption of the plaintiff's state common law claims: "No statement relating
to smoking and health or other than the statement required by ... this Act,
shall be required on any cigarette package [and n]o statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes...
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."2" In addressing
whether the application of state common law should be preempted as a form
of state "regulation," the Court wrote:
[T]hese provisions merely prohibit state and federal rule-making
bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements ...[and] this
reading is appropriate for several reasons. First.... we must construe
these provisions in light of the presumption against pre-emption of
state police power regulations.... Second, the warning required in
[the 1965 Act] ...does not by its own effect foreclose additional
obligations imposed under state law. That Congress requires a
particular warning label does not automatically pre-empt a regulatory
field. Third, there is no general, inherent conflict between federal
preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality
of state common law damage actions."'
The seven Justices who agreed that neither this language nor the operation
of the 1965 Act necessitated the preemption of state common law split
fourthree on the question of whether the 1969 Act sufficiently broadened the
preemptive effect of federal law to result in the preemption of the state
common law doctrines in question. The plurality of four justices wrote that
"the [1969 Act] bars not simply 'statements' but rather 'requirement[s] or
prohibition[s] ... imposed under state law ... [and also] reaches beyond
statements 'in the advertising' to obligations 'with respect to the advertising or
promotion' of cigarettes. 2 62 As a result, the plurality found that the
plaintiff's claims with respect to failure to warn (arising out of notice of health
consequences) and fraudulent misrepresentation (arising out of alleged
attempts to neutralize the federal warnings) were preempted, whereas those
claims based on failure to warn (arising out of testing, research, and sales),
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation (arising out of alleged failure to
act on medical and scientific information), and alleged conspiracy to defraud
were not preempted.
The four-three split focused on whether the 1969 Act preempted certain
state private causes of action. Relying on Garmon H, the plurality noted that
"[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. 2 63 Based on this
characterization of private law, the plurality determined that all state common
law claims accruing after the effective date of the 1969 Act were preempted if

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

514.
518.
520.
521 (quoting Garmon H, 359 U.S. at 247).
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they concerned a "requirement or prohibition ... with respect to...
advertising or promotion [of cigarettes] ' 264
Recognizing that Congress wishes to prevent inconsistent regulation does
not mean that all state law must be preempted. Indeed, the plurality recognized
that private law implicates not only the question of how people will be
warned, but whether the individuals who have been warned will be
compensated when they incur a loss. 2 65 With respect to the 1969 Act,
however, the plurality approach sweeps the compensatory element of private
tort law from the field without allowing for the possibility that a claim can be
made out under state law without raising the "ceiling" of federal regulation or
changing the conduct of potentially liable parties. 2"
Nothing in the 1969 Act indicates that Congress was concerned with the
compensatory function of state tort law. Therefore, ascribing a particular intent
to Congress in this regard is incorrect.267 The plurality in Cipollone
determined that preemption was appropriate pursuant to the 1969 Act by
applying background principles which "err on the side of' preserving federal
law.2" Because this opinion simply relies on the background assumptions applied by certain members of the Court to a general preemption clause, it provides little guidance, if any, to courts trying to apply its analysis to the tort
laws of other states or to other preemption questions."
It is not surprising that courts will often have little explicit congressional
language to guide them as they decide how to integrate private law into
federalized fields of law. As one commentator notes:
When Congress does focus attention on the relation of its acts to state
laws dealing with the same subject matter, it looks to certain existing

264. Id. at 524 (quoting the 1969 Act).
265. The plurality recognized this when it wrote, "there is no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state common law damages actions." Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 518 (citing the Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 30 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994))). Furthermore, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, "the question whether common-law damages actions exert a regulatory effect on manufacturers analogous to positive
enactments-an assumption crucial to the Court's conclusion ... is significantly more complicated than the Court's brief quotation from [Garmon II] would suggest." Id. at 543 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concurring and dissenting opinion, the plurality
treatment of the Smokeless Tobacco Act of 1986 demonstrates that these positions are not at all
incompatible. Id. at 543.
267. The plurality asserted that its consideration of preemption could be resolved solely based
on the congressional intent concerning preemption as explicitly expressed in the 1965 and 1969
Acts. Id.
268. 1 reach this conclusion because both the plurality and the two Justices who joined Justice
Blackmun's concurrence and dissent found that the preemptive scope of the 1965 and 1969 Acts
could be ascertained by their express language. Obviously background principles and legal predispositions were applied to reach these opposite results while purporting to rely solely on the same
provisions.
269. Despite their significant differences with respect to the preemption questions raised by
the 1965 and 1969 Acts, the concurring and dissenting opinions agreed on the difficulties lower
courts will face in their attempts to follow the plurality's opinion. Justice Scalia wrote: "Like
Justice Blackmun, 'I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in attempting to implement [today's] decision."' Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 555 (quoting Blackmun's dissent at
543-44).
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state laws. It is grotesquely unrealistic to suppose that Congress, in
expressing a general intent to save or to preempt state laws, actively
considered all possible state enactments touching the field of the
federal law. Indeed, Congress probably expressed such an intent
without a comprehensive survey of existing state laws tangentially
affecting the field of federal law, and for good reason. Many potential
relationships between state and federal laws are unforeseeable at the
time the federal act was adopted. The speculative nature of attempting
to anticipate conflicts and difficulties in the prospective operation of a
proposed law has long been recognized by the Court as a reason for
avoiding advisory opinions; the same problems of speculation
confront Congress in providing for preemption of state laws.27
The Cipollone case shows the flaws inherent in the position that courts should
rely solely on "congressional intent" as the basis for analyzing preemption.
The Court ignores the fact that when the 1965 and 1969 Acts became federal
law, private law claims against cigarette manufacturers could not succeed."'
In this situation, determining the preemptive scope intended by Congress is an
entirely contrived exercise. This is not to say that Congress should not address
the question of preemption. Congress has an obvious incentive to make its
views on preemption as clear as possible: this is the best means available to it
to ensure that courts approach questions of preemption with some knowledge
of what Congress intended at the time federal law was enacted.272 When the
1969 Act was enacted, successful suits against tobacco companies were more
than twenty years and a number of developments in tort law in the future.
Because courts will address questions of preemption that were unforeseeable
when federal law was adopted, courts must rely on background assumptions.
By limiting their choices to preempting a common law principle completely or
allowing it to operate within the federalized field, however, courts often err on
the side of eliminating important principles of common law from such fields,
based primarily on the force of background principles, rather than a principled
consideration of whether elements of state private law should be retained
within the federal scheme. This approach to preemption gives greater credence
to the "background assumptions" a judge brings to a case than her reasoned
consideration of whether some aspects of state law can be retained within the
federalized field.
To be sure, there are those who defend the current "dichotomy" approach
to preemption. Its defenders might argue that allowing courts to define unique

270. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 LAw F. 515, 543 (1972).
271. "During the 'first wave' of tobacco litigation [1950s and 1960s], the defendants usually
prevailed because courts and juries felt that the link between smoking and disease was not so
solidly established that the defendants should have known of the danger. Defendants used assumption of risk as a secondary defense." Note, Cipollone v. Ligett Group, Inc.: Supreme Court
Takes Middle Ground in Cigarette Litigation, 67 TuL. L. REV. 787, 802 (1993). Indeed, courts
imposed both of these theories in the same cases, despite the conflict in absolving cigarette manufacturers because the dangers of smoking were unknown and simultaneously imposing partial
responsibility on smokers because they assumed the risks inherent in smoking. Id. at 799.
272. If a Congress does not act with sufficient clarity, the best it can hope for is that subsequent Congresses will enact new laws to implement its intent.
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federal common law within federalized fields would expand the powers of
federal courts, often at the expense of state lawmakers. As discussed above,
this argument has little force in instances where state law would otherwise be
preempted."' A review of preemption decisions, however, reveals instances
where a court assumed that it was confronted with a choice between
preempting state law or allowing it to operate within the federalized field.274
In some of these instances, the court chose to leave state law undisturbed. 75
There is force to the argument that the Court may not have allowed state law
to remain undisturbed if it believed that it possessed the option of creating
federal common law. Some might argue that this margin of cases justifies the
restrictive approach toward federal common law because it provides the
greatest opportunity for state private law to provide the rule of decision
applied by either federal or state courts. The next section explores situations
where it appears that state law is allowed to "operate of its own force."
B.

The Illusion of State Law "Operating of its Own Force" in Highly
Federalized Fields of Law

Federal common law provides one means for preserving the general thrust
of state private laws within highly federalized fields of law. One response to
this proposal is the argument that it is more deferential to states to allow state
law to operate "of its own force" within federalized fields. The Burger Court
preemption decisions of the early 1970s often recognized that state laws within
federalized fields should not be presumed to interfere with federal
programs.276 Some suggested that these decisions constitute a "mid-course"
correction in preemption jurisprudence or an attempt to restore "balance" to
preemption analysis that is too solicitous to federal interests.277
Understandably, the preservation of state law in federalized fields is more
common when the "preserved" state law is private law, such as a private cause
of action, rather than a form of state regulation.27 It would, however, be
incorrect to assert that state law operates without regard to federal objectives
in federalized fields. Such state law is to a greater or lessor degree federalized

273. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
274. I agree with Professor Field's view that the current "restraint" on the creation of federal
common law is self-imposed. Cf. supra note 146. Thus, courts are precluded from making common law based largely on whether they believe a common law rule is necessary and appropriate
and whether they believe that their decision might be overturned.
275. See, e.g., the cases discussed infra note 276.
276. See, e.g.. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (denying facial challenge to state law
making it illegal to hire illegal aliens); New York Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
413, 417, 422 (1973) (finding no preemption of a state statute terminating federal public assistance
of "employable" persons). This trend is discussed in The Law of Preemption, supra note 23.
277. See, e.g., Robert S. Catz & Howard B. Lenard, The Demise of the Implied FederalPreemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977) (noting that recent decisions of the Supreme Court regarding problems of federal preemption have sought to balance state and federal
interests); The Law of Preemption, supra note 23.
278. Compare the cases cited supra note 276, with Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151
(1978) (finding that state regulation of oil tanker construction preempted), and Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (finding state regulation of airport traffic preempted).
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because it is retained only up to the point where it interferes with federal
objectives. Therefore, courts must apply this private law with sensitivity to
federal policies. Some might argue that if this state law "operates of its own
force," it is modified to serve (or at least not interfere with) federal programs.
In some instances, this is carried so far that it is not clear whether state law is
operating of its own force or has been integrated into federal law.
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,279 the Supreme Court considered
whether federal laws regulating the nuclear energy industry preempted a tort
claim by the estate of a nuclear energy worker who was exposed to nuclear
materials. As the Court noted, the legislative history of the pertinent federal
legislation contained "ample evidence that Congress had no intention of
forbidding the State to provide such remedies.""28 The Court also wrote that
"[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."28' While this
approach is arguably deferential to state law, it would not be accurate to
describe the preserved state laws as "operating of their own force." The Court
also stated:
We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in which the
federal law would pre-empt the recovery of damages based on state
law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned,
preemption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal
Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that state
remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the
imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the
objectives of the federal law. We perceive no such conflict or
frustration in the circumstances of this case.282
State law therefore still retains force in this highly federalized field, but only
to the extent that it stays within unspecified parameters. As a result, a court
applying state tort law is put on notice that application of its laws in a manner
that "would frustrate the objectives of federal law" will result in an
invalidation of its decision. Certainly this is preferable to preempting state law
based on the possibility that it will interfere with federal objectives. At the
same time, it goes too far to characterize such law as "operating of its own
force." Such state law must be applied with a sensitivity to federal objectives.
For that reason, a state court (or federal court in a diversity case) will
presumably develop specialized principles of law to be applied in this field. To
be sure, such covert federalization of state law adopts much of the substance
of this article's proposal. There are several advantages to a policy of explicitly
identifying the "uniquely federalized" aspects of such state private law. Most
importantly, it will ensure that modified private law principles are not
mistaken for private law principles developed without regard to federal

279. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
280. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
281. Id. (citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954)).
282. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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objectives. In short, even though Silkwood leaves states free to apply their own
law to these cases, they (or federal courts applying such state law) must create
a specialized type of law in such federalized fields in order to prevent
interference with federal objectives.
In fields of law heavily influenced by federal laws, whatever state law
courts allow to remain will inevitably become federalized. Indeed, it is
sometimes difficult to 'determine whether state law is fulfilling an independent
purpose or only fulfilling federal purposes. "When the Supreme Court decides
to let state law operate [of its own force], it often does not indicate whether
state law is28 3operating of its own force or because it adequately serves federal
purposes.,

C. Federalizing State Law through the Creation of Private Causes of Action
To the extent that the current approach to preemption precludes state
common law from addressing questions of private law within federalized
fields, federal courts must be free to fashion common law, or the field of law
will be devoid of private law. Through the creation of private causes of action,
federal courts eliminate many of the tensions that result from preemption that
prevents state private law from filling gaps within federal regulatory programs.
Specifically, the Warren and early Burger Courts' jurisprudence on the
question of whether federal courts should recognize "implied rights of
action '2 84 based on federal statutes, effectively federalized principles of
private law that are generally embodied in state common law, thereby
preventing gaps in federalized fields of law, without endangering federal
regulatory regimes.285 However, the Supreme Court has generally created
these private rights of action as supplements to either federal administrative
action or to causes of action explicitly established by the federal statute.286
As such, these rights of action were easily challenged on separation-of-powers
grounds, based upon arguments that they usurped congressional authority.287

283. Field, supra note 15; at n.397 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977);
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1966)).
284. This term is described at supra notes 175, 177.
285. The treatment of implied rights of action in HART & WECHSLER demonstrates that the
implication of private rights of action is, at least initially, a choice that requires consideration of
whether state law can be integrated into the federal regime, or whether a uniquely federal remedy
is necessary:
When Congress imposes a duty, it may say nothing about sanctions or remedies in the
event of violation; it may provide criminal sanctions but be silent as to the availability
of civil remedies; or it may specify particular administrative or judicial remedies and say
nothing about others. In each of these instances, the federal courts may be asked to
determine (a) whether, and to what extent, state remedies are available to redress violations, and (b) whether, and to what extent, the courts should recognize a federal remedy
not expressly authorized by the governing statute.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 943-44.
286. See supra Part III.D.2.
287. Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out that "courts reacted to perceived inadequacies
in agency enforcement efforts by creating private rights of action .... The [current Supreme]
Court's restrictive approach to private rights of action makes it far less likely that such rights will
be recognized." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1217.
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This article argues that private causes of action should be viewed as the
necessary means of maintaining private law within federalized fields of law.
Courts should, of course, refuse to create private causes of action when private
enforcement of these rights would disrupt federal statutory objectives.288 This
article is less concerned with the place of federal common law in our
federalism than with the place of private law within federalized fields of
law.289 Because federal common law is generally approached as a conflict
between judicial and other federal branches or between federal and state
authority, the preservation of private law is rarely addressed.
Analysis of modem federal private rights of action generally begin with
the Supreme Court's decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.29 In Borak, the
Court addressed the question of whether a private cause of action can be
brought by investors alleging injury resulting from a violation of fair dealing
standards established by federal securities laws. Quoting Sola Electric v.
Jefferson Electric Co.,29 the Court stated:
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions,
the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the
federal policy which it has adopted.292
As discussed above, one of the justifications for creating a federal
administrative state was the need to protect public and disparate "private"
interests that appeared unsuitable for resolution within the context of private
lawsuits." These federal programs generally consisted of the creation of
both federal standards and administrative entities charged with the enforcement
and development of these standards. Yet some courts and commentators were
concerned with implications of this development on the continued relevance of
an independent judiciary. As discussed above, many of the "second order
remedies" constitute one judicial response to this circumstance.294
Nothing in its decision demonstrates that the Borak Court was concerned
with the need to incorporate principles of state private law within the federal
securities regulatory regime. The Court was concerned with the need to
provide a uniform tort action against violators, and it feared that such actions
might not exist if the implication of such actions was left to the each state's
laws.295 Private rights of action were not inferred in Borak ',i order to

288. Professors Stewart and Sunstein discuss various circumstances in which these "private
correctives" or "second order remedies" interfere with orderly administration by federal agencies.
Id.
289. Id. See also Field, supra note 15, for a thoughtful discussion of the place of federal
common law in our federalism.
290. 377 U.S. 426, 431-32, 434 (1964).
291. 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
292. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
293. See supra Part III.A.
294. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
295. The Court wrote that:
If federal jurisdiction were limited to the granting of declaratory relief, victims of deceptive proxy statements would be obliged to go into state courts for remedial relief. And if
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incorporate principles of state private law. The Court wished to provide federal
courts with a mechanism to participate in federal securities regulation. As one
commentator writes, "Borak treats plaintiffs not as victims so much as 'private
attorneys general' to whom damages are paid as a reward for bringing lawsuits
that serve the public purpose of deterring securities violations."" 9
The Borak Court saw private lawsuits as a useful mechanism for
supplementing the enforcement of federal securities laws.297 Viewed from
this perspective, the private cause of action implied in Borak is susceptible to
the argument that Congress, rather than the Court, should have determined the
extent to which private enforcement activities were necessary to effectuate the
purposes of federal securities regulation or the companion argument that "this
melding of private enforcement and public goals may be ill-suited to the
'
regulatory scheme of the securities acts."298
Both of- these arguments could
be easily overcome if the Court had based its decision on the need to preserve
private law within a federalized field of law. The Court could have pointed out
that as a result of the federalization of the field of securities regulation, it was
unlikely that standards of conduct defined by state law could withstand
preemption scrutiny. By creating a federal common law for this field,
however, federal courts could draw on state law principles to define private
causes of action that integrate state law without interfering with federal
objectives.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash 2 provided the basis for
the approach to federal common law advocated by this article. This case
determined whether a stockholder could prosecute a derivative action against a
corporation's directors for their alleged violation of federal election campaign
finance. laws. Three of the four criteria the Court described for determining
whether a private cause of action should be inferred are unremarkable
principles that have long been a part of judicial consideration of whether a
statutory violation creates the basis for private relief. These three criteria allow
for courts to consider legislative' intent and to consider whether a private cause
of action will interfere with the legislative program:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the defendant? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?3"
The fourth criterion announced by the Court is not, by itself, a threat to
the idea that federal causes of action should be created in highly federalized

the law of the State happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading proxy
statements, the whole purpose of the section might be frustrated.
Borak, 377 U.S. at 434-35.
296. Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 557 (1981).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 422 U.S. 66, 69 (1975).
300. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
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fields of law. The Court wrote that a relevant consideration is whether "the
cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law.""'' In Cort, there seemed to be little
reason to infer a cause of action based on the federal law. As the Court wrote,
"except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
of the corporation." ' 2 Cort's author, Justice Brennan, points out that the case
implicates few (if any) federal concerns. As a result, an appropriate action
could be brought in state court based on state law principles without concern
that the state law would interfere with federal policy.
Justice Brennan recognized, however, that in those fields heavily
influenced by federal law it might be inappropriate to allow states to
determine whether a private cause of action should exist and what standard of
conduct it should enforce. For example, in areas of greater federalization, such
as the right of union members to bring private causes of action based on the
campaign finance statute, the Court noted that the federal interest and
influence in labor law might necessitate the creation of a federal cause of
action.3" 3 In light of the fact that a state cause of action against labor union
officials for the same conduct alleged in Cort might easily interfere with a
federal labor policy, it is entirely appropriate that these questions should be
resolved as a question of federal law.
The decision in Cort set the stage for an approach to preemption which
recognized that in federalized fields of law, federal courts should create private
rights of action that are consistent with federal policies. State private law
would, by itself, often be preempted by federal law, leaving the field of law
without any private law. 3" By contrast, in some instances, such as the facts
of Cort, states could be free to apply their own private law without fear that it
would be found to stand as an obstacle to federal policies.
Justice Brennan's invitation to base the creation of a private cause of
action on federalism grounds (i.e. preserving state law)-rather than on a
desire by federal courts to overcome limitations on federal administrative
authority-was ignored. Instead, the definition of private causes of action was
swept up in a judicial "counter-reformation" as the members of the Court

301. Id. at 78.
302. Id. at 84.
303. Id. at 82 n.13.
304. Indeed, some fields of law have become so federalized that an exception to the "wellpleaded complaint rule" allows defendants to obtain removal to federal court to hear their preemption defense. As the Court explained in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987):
"One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule ... is that Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this selected group of claims is necessarily
federal in character." Id. at 63-64. Until Metropolitan Life, this exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule was only applied in the context of labor law and the treaty interests of Indian
tribes. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 n.8 (1987). Since Metropolitan Life,
federal courts have expanded the range of areas where they find "complete preemption." These
include areas of federal banking law, M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th
Cir. 1991), and contracts involving Indian gaming, see, e.g., Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey &
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 545-46 (8th Cir. 1996).
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working to limit some elements of federal judicial authority successfully
portrayed these remedies as an affront to both separation of powers and
federalism. This development was itself an element of an approach to judicial
authority that characterized courts as simply the implementors of policy
decisions made by the drafters of legislation and the Constitution. 5
Beginning with Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,3" many members of the Supreme Court began asserting that
congressional intent, as demonstrated by the explicit statutory language, should
generally determine whether a private cause of action should be implied by
federal courts.7' Such an approach would have little effect in instances like
Cort, where state private law will not interfere with the federal regime. In
those cases, relief to vindicate private rights can be had in state courts.0 8
Where a state law private claim is implicated, a tension results: the federal
regulatory regime may not have been constructed to address the full range of
private rights that may have been violated, yet the need to prevent interference
with federal law may result in the preemption of any state private causes of
action. The creation of federal common law resolves this problem: state
private law is prevented from interfering with federal objectives because it is
federalized.
V.

CONCLUSION

A number of commentators argue that courts should refrain from
preempting state law in the absence of any indication that Congress "intended"
such a result.3 " Proponents of this position assert that it will result in greater

305. One commentator explains:
The Court now invokes a literalist reading of statutory terms as a surrogate for actual
legislative intent. Thus, statutory words themselves are said to "announce [] Congress'
considered judgment," to "embod[y]" a chosen legislative "compromise," to strike a
"balance" between "opposing policy arguments." The Court, then, will not expand literal
words in the process of interpretation, for doing so would amount to "rewriting rules"
enacted by Congress. Hence what Congress enacts is precisely what Congress intends.
Through this congruence of literalism and legislative intent, "strict adherence" to the
statute's chosen words has now become the new touchstone of statutory interpretation.
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law, supra note 56, at 894-95 (internal citations
omitted).
306. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Powell wrote that
[t]he 'four factor' analysis of [Cort] is an open invitation to federal courts to legislate
causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evidence of affirmative
congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.
Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
308. Of course, where the jurisdiction of a federal court can be invoked based on diversity of
citizenship or through the assertion of the state claim through pendant jurisdiction, such claims
can be brought in federal court and, pursuant to Erie, as discussed above, state law will apply. See
generally supra Part III.C. See also supra note 132 (discussing the general constitutional requirements for federal jurisdiction).
309. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 14, at 71; see also Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at
55 ("In our federal system, Congress has a duty to address clearly whether a federal enactment has
displaced state law."). The Supreme Court's current infatuation with the idea that all questions
relating to a statute's application can be resolved by references to its explicit text is explored in
the materials cited supra notes 12, 17-19.
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certainty in preemption analysis. Yet the Supremacy Clause directs courts, not
Congress, to implement its mandate." 0 Also, it is difficult to imagine that
courts would uniformly apply this principle within the context of private
law. 3 ' Indeed, even where Congress does explicitly address the preemption
of private law, judges and justices apply preexisting background principles to
such "saving" or "preemption" clauses to obtain the same results that they
would probably reach if Congress had not addressed the matter in the first
place.3 2 This position is itself the product of certain assumptions concerning
federalism, separation of powers, and whether private law should be allowed
to disturb purely private ordering. While these assumptions are legitimate,
alternative assumptions are at least equally so. And these alternative
assumptions do not lead to the conclusion that federal preemption should only
result from express statements. This article argues that courts should instead
consider whether any improvements can be made in the legitimate approaches
to federal preemption.
Thus background principles are applied which find state law preempted
and which do not allow for the creation of federal common law. Various
formulations of preemption analysis accompany these trends. Both of the most
recent trends tend to favor the preemption of state law, although for very
different reasons. During and immediately after the New Deal, preemption of
state private law served to enhance federal authority by preempting competing
state judicial actions. The most recent trend tends to find state law preempted
in order to limit judicial interference with private economic ordering through
judicial development of federal statutes.
Notwithstanding the importance of private law to our federalism, scant
attention has been paid to the question of how private law principles can be
preserved within federalized fields. This article points out that the creation of
federal common law represents one option for "balancing" out the swings that
occur as divergent background principles are applied to determine whether
Congress "intended" to preempt state law. This is not to say that this proposal
is not without its own background assumptions. For example, it assumes that
private law is an important part of our federalism. It assumes that states
should have the preeminent right to define private law principles.
Nevertheless, it assumes that Congress is not able, nor is it required, to

310. The text of the Supremacy Clause is set out supra note 30 and a brief synopsis of its
history is set out supra note 122. Although the Constitutional Convention specified that congressional work-product would take precedence over state laws, it left courts with the responsibility
for implementing this element of federalism. See supra note 122. Courts are required to exercise
their responsibility under the Supremacy Clause whether Congress "intended" to preempt state
law. Courts abdicate their constitutional responsibility if they rely solely on "congressional intent"
to determine whether state law should be preempted.
311. In a number of fields, the Supreme Court or Congress established such a "clear statement" rule, only to subsequently have federal courts create exceptions. For example, the AntiInjunction Act prohibits federal courts from granting injunctions except as "expressly authorized."
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). In Mitchum v. Foster, however, the Supreme Court determined that the
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), constitutes such an exception even though §
1983 does not expressly refer to the Anti-Injunction Act. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
312. The discussion of Cipollone v. Ligett Group, supra notes 253-72 and accompanying text,
demonstrates this observation.
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delineate all state laws that will be preempted by its legislative work product.
As a result, courts will often be called on to determine whether federal statutes
should be interpreted to preempt state laws. Requiring state courts to choose
between preempting state law or allowing state law to operate of its own force
will, in some instances, result in (at least the appearance of) state law being
applied in federalized fields. Sometimes this result would not occur if courts
had the opportunity to create a unique common law for the federalized field.
Nevertheless, even where state law appears to "operate of its own force," it is
covertly federalized. For this reason, it is preferable for courts to explicitly
state whether state law is actually serving federal purposes. Finally, this
proposal assumes that it is preferable for courts to preempt only those portions
of state law that interfere with federal objectives. These objectives and
assumptions are compatible with the creation of federal common law to
integrate state private law within federalized fields of law.

